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ABSTRACT
There are two problems at the interface of electrical power and economics that are examined
in this thesis. The first problem addresses the issue of optimally operating electric vehicle (EV)
charging stations, where price as well as scheduling of purchasing, storing, and charging play key
roles. The second problem addresses the challenge faced by electric power system operators who
have to balance power generation and demand at all times, and are faced with the task of maximiz-
ing the social welfare of all affected entities comprised of producers, consumers and prosumers
(e.g., homes with solar panels who may be producers at some times and consumers at other times).
For the first problem, we have developed a layered decomposition approach that permits a
holistic solution to solving the scheduling, storage and pricing problems of charging stations. The
key idea is to decompose problems by time-scale.
For the second problem, we have shown that for the special case of LQG agents, by careful
construction of a sequence of layered VCG payments over time, the intertemporal effect of current
bids on future payoffs can be decoupled, and truth-telling of dynamic states is guaranteed if system
parameters are known and agents are rational. We have also shown that a modification of the VCG
payments, called scaled-VCG payments, achieves Budget Balance and Individual Rationality for a
range of scaling, under a certain identified Market Power Balance condition.
ii
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES
Contributors
This work was supported by a dissertation committee consisting of Professor P. R. Kumar,
Professor Le Xie and Professor Srinivas Shakkottai of the Department of Electrical & Computer
Engineering and Professor Steven Puller of the Department of Economics.
The algorithms in Chapter 3 were developed in collaboration with Dr. Rahul Singh.
All other work conducted for the dissertation was completed by the student independently.
Funding Sources
This work was supported in part by NSF Contract ECCS-1760554, NSF Science & Technol-
ogy Center Grant CCF-0939370, the Power Systems Engineering Research Center (PSERC), NSF
Contract IIS-1636772, and NSF Contract ECCS-1760554.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
CONTRIBUTORS AND FUNDING SOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF TABLES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1. INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. A LAYERED ARCHITECTURE FOR EV CHARGING STATION BASED ON TIME-
SCALE DECOMPOSITION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.3 Top-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.4 Middle-layer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.5 Bottom-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.6 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6.1 Top-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.6.2 Middle-layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.7 Computation complexity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.8 The Cost of the Layered Policy and the Value of Battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3. OPTIMAL MARKET OPERATION WITH DER FLEXIBILITIES: PROBLEM FOR-
MULATION AND SOLUTION CONCEPT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.2 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3 Problem Formulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.4 Deterministic Case: Day-ahead Market. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.5 Stochastic Case: Real-time Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.6 Numerical Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.6.1 Deterministic dynamic case: An example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.6.2 Stochastic case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
4. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
iv
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.2 Related Works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 The Static and Dynamic Deterministic VCG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4.4 The Dynamic Stochastic VCG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.4.1 Budget Balance and Individual Rationality in LQG systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4.2 Lagrange Optimality in LQG Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
5. CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
v
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE Page
2.1 Solar Electric Vehicle Charging Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.2 Envisioned infrastructure for charging station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.3 Layered decomposition approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.4 Numerical result of top layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Battery level, grid power price and amount of grid power purchase for days 10− 18. 19
2.6 Total profit in January as a function of the periodicity of price change. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
2.7 The evolution of the optimal policy for a specific sample path . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.8 The ratio of total profit obtained by the layered algorithm to its upper bound . . . . . . . . . 23
2.9 Total profit comparisons with and without battery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.10 Total profit as a function of battery capacity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 Ambient temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Convergence of LMPs at time t = 14 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
3.3 LMPs at different locations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
3.4 Comparison of total utility per day. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.5 Comparison of total utility per month. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
3.6 Comparison of Day-ahead LMP and Real-time LMP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.7 Variance of prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.8 Changes in total utility as variance of noise varies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
vi
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE Page
2.1 Probability mass function of grid power price in each interval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Average costs of different policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
vii
1. INTRODUCTION
There are two problems at the interface of electrical power and economics that are examined
in this thesis. The first problem addresses the issue of optimally operating electric vehicle (EV)
charging stations, where price as well as scheduling of purchasing, storing, and charging play key
roles. The second problem addresses the challenge faced by electric power system operators who
have to balance power generation and demand at all times, and are faced with the task of maximiz-
ing the social welfare of all affected entities comprised of producers, consumers and prosumers
(e.g., homes with solar panels who may be producers at some times and consumers at other times).
Price is the “amount of money expected, required, or given in payment for something" [1]. In
economics, price in a free market is arrived at after the interaction between supply and demand:
the price is set such that quantity supplied equals quantity demanded. However, when the seller has
great market power, it can generate more profit by dividing consumers into groups with separate
demand curves and charging different prices to each group. The idea of price discrimination plays
a fundamental role in determining the prices of EV charging in Chapter 2. Also, since the price
of electricity is time-varying, the operator has to optimize when to purchase power, how much
to store, and how to recharge customers with time deadlines. We present a layered decomposition
approach and supporting theory that permit a holistic solution to the storage, scheduling and pricing
problems of Electric Vehicle (EV) Charging Stations.
In Chapter 3, we are motivated by the problems faced by Independent System Operators (ISO)
in allocating power generations and demands for agents in a power network such that social wel-
fare is maximized, while balancing supply and demand, and satisfying network constraints. One
centralized way to determine prices and make allocations to balance supply and demand is through
calculating the values of Lagrange multipliers in an optimization problem. However, since the cen-
tral agent, the ISO, does not know the details of the producers and consumers, it cannot formulate
the optimization problem. Hence the solution will need to be based on an interaction between the
ISO and the producers and consumers. We address a key issue of designing the market bidding
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structure that induces dynamic cooperation among agents in a dynamic decentralized fashion.
A key problem in connection with bidding is that when agents attempt to anticipate the ef-
fects of their actions on prices, strategic bidding arises, and the ability to converge to a social
welfare optimal solution, i.e., to attain efficiency of the system, degrades. The problem of de-
signing mechanisms so that truth telling is optimal for agents, called incentive compatibility, has
been well examined for static agents who only have to bid once [2]. However agents in power
systems are governed a dynamic system that is subject to stochastic uncertainties. In Chapter 4,
for a set of linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) [3] agents, we propose a modified layered version of
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) [2] mechanism for payments that decouples the intertemporal
effect of current bids on future payoffs, and establish that truth-telling of dynamic states forms a
dominant strategy if system parameters are known and agents are rational. One would also like to
ensure that the mechanism is “fair" in the sense that it charges each customer a fair “price". We
further address the issue of ensuring budget balance, which ensures that the ISO does not have to
subsidize the market, and individual rationality, which ensures that agents will not drop put of the
market. We propose a modified Scaled VCG (SVCG) mechanism that satisfies incentive compati-
bility, social efficiency, budget balance and individual rationality for a power market consisting of
LQG type agents.
2
2. A LAYERED ARCHITECTURE FOR EV CHARGING STATION BASED ON
TIME-SCALE DECOMPOSITION ∗
2.1 Introduction
Infrastructures such as fast charging stations, shown in Fig. 2.1, will be crucial for the pro-
liferation of Electric Vehicles (EVs). They play a psychological role, alleviating range anxiety of
EV drivers, and also a functional role, providing incentives for higher utilization of infrastructures.
There are two issues to consider in the design and operation of such charging stations. One con-
cerns infrastructure, i.e., what kinds of devices are required, and what are the optimal quantities
and sizes of these devices from both technological and economic perspectives. The other is opera-
tional, i.e., how to set prices, and schedule power purchase, storage and charging, such that profit
is maximized while guaranteeing quality of service to arriving EVs. We focus on the latter issue in
this chapter
We consider a single charging station connected to the electricity grid. While supply of power
is thereby guaranteed, the price at which wholesale level grid power can be bought by a charging
station is variable and greatly impacts its economic operation. One solution is to introduce on-site
energy storage. Such storage also increases the number of EVs that can be charged simultaneously
by increasing the peak constraint on grid power drawn, thereby enhancing economic viability of
charging stations. Bae and Kwasinski [4] estimates charging demand for a station near a highway
exit and conclude that adequate energy storage can reduce charging price. Bayram et al. [5, 6]
demonstrates that storage capacity is key to minimizing charging cost while guaranteeing system
performance. To alleviate CO2 emissions it is desirable if renewable energy supplies are employed
to meet the increased demand of EV charging stations [7, 8].
So motivated, we analyze charging stations as in Fig. 2.2 with sufficient energy storage capac-
ity, connected to the grid from which they can buy electric power, as well as access to a source of
∗Part of this Chapter is reprinted with permission from "A Layered Architecture for EV Charging Stations based
on Time-Scale Decomposition" by Ke Ma, Le Xie, and P. R. Kumar, in 2014 IEEE International Conference on Smart
Grid Communications (SmartGridComm), pp. 674-679, Nov 2014.
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Figure 2.1: Solar Electric Vehicle Charging Station
renewable power.
There has been growing work on the problem of scheduling EVs. Zhang et al. [9] incorporates
renewable sources in the station and models it as a Markov decision process with uncertainty in
both grid power price and EV arrivals. It aims at minimizing total cost but does not consider the
influence of price on arrival rates of EVs. Chen et al. [10, 11] formulate charging as a deadline
scheduling problem and propose an on-line algorithm with admission control to achieve the max-
imum competitive ratio. They introduce a pricing function, tied to the individual utility of each
charging request, to provide economic incentives for customers to relax their deadlines. The pa-
pers utilize price to control the arrival of EVs, but do not aim at maximizing running profit. There
does not appear to exist any work that holistically addresses the operation of charging stations tak-
ing into account the optimal utilization of battery storage, the availability of renewable energy, the
fluctuation in grid power price, and the stochastic EV arrivals with rate modulated by the pricing
scheme. Our goal is to address this overall problem incorporating all of these coupled features.
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Figure 2.2: Envisioned infrastructure for charging station
We propose a decomposition that is layered by time-scale to handle this overall problem. In the
top layer, a deterministic pricing scheme for EV customers is developed by considering the long-
term average grid power price and availability of renewable energy, plus price-demand curves
for different types of energy requests with different relative deadlines, i.e., remaining times to
the absolute deadlines [12]. In the middle layer, we develop an optimal policy to determine the
amounts of energy to buy from the grid and to use for charging in successive time intervals. We
model customer arrivals as a stochastic process modulated by the price determined by the top
layer and announced to customers. In the bottom layer, we fulfill all charging requests without
missing deadlines by prioritizing requests with earlier deadlines, and using the optimal charging
scheme derived in the middle layer. This three layer decomposition provides a tractable and holistic
solution, illustrated by examples in Section 2.3 – 2.5. By using wholesale electricity data from
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), we also show that it is beneficial to incorporate
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storage devices in the charging station in the long run. We demonstrate that the architectural
solution proposed does not incur any significant loss of optimality [13].
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, the charging station model
is described, followed by the layered decomposition approach. In Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5, we
formulate the mathematical model of each layer and provide a solution. In Section 2.6, numerical
examples for each layer are provided. In Section 2.7, we discuss the complexity of the algorithms,
followed by the discussion of optimality and the value of a battery in Section 2.8.
2.2 Model
We assume that there are two sources of power available, as in Fig. 2.2. Grid power is avail-
able at a price that fluctuates with time, which may be partially predictable. Renewable power is
inexpensive, but its availability fluctuates with time. Energy storage that is co-located with the
charging station allows the station operator to buy power from the grid and store it when the price
is low, and it also mitigates fluctuations of power generated by the renewable resource. Customer
arrivals, energy requirements and relative deadlines are random, and are modulated by the prices
announced by the charging station. Although the price-demand curve, which we will formally
introduce in Section 2.3, is sufficient to capture the aggregate behavior of customers, the proba-
bilistic characteristics of customers may depend on the price being charged for various services by
the charging station since individual response of any customer is random. All the above give rise
to an overall real-time stochastic scheduling problem.
To deal with the overall complexity, we introduce a layered decomposition approach by ex-
ploiting the time scales involved. Wholesale electricity price changes every 15 minutes. If we
limit our focus to this time scale, then the individual demand coming from each customer is ran-
dom, grid power price fluctuates randomly, and renewable supply also varies randomly. However,
when we consider a longer time scale, for instance one day, the aggregate total demand of all cus-
tomers in a day is relatively predictable. Fluctuations of grid power price and renewable energy
averaged over a day are also comparatively smaller with respect to historical data. It is thus rea-
sonable to model grid power price and renewable power supply on a daily basis as deterministic
6
based on historical data. Total aggregate demand can also be regarded as a deterministic function
of the price as given by the price-demand curve. Thus, we address the problem of how to set
prices for different customers requesting different amounts of energy with different deadlines in a
deterministic fashion.
Subsequently, we address the decisions to be made at a shorter time scale of 15 minutes. Over
such a short time period, the charging price is constant and we can model the number of customers
arriving in each 15 minute time slot, with a specific energy requirement and deadline, as a random
variable with mean determined by the price from the demand curve. Modeling the fluctuating grid
power price also as a random process, stochastic optimal control is used to determine how much
to buy and use in each 15 minute time slot.
Finally, we consider real-time EV arrivals. We solve the scheduling problem of meeting cus-
tomer requests by simply giving priority to customers with earlier deadlines.
Combining all the algorithms in the three-layer decoupled manner, we obtain the overall solu-
tion shown in Fig. 2.3.
2.3 Top-layer
At the topmost layer, we employ a deterministic model of customer response, and determine
the optimal pricing scheme to control the total demand from customers. The relationship between
aggregate (not short-term dynamic) demand and price is captured by the price-demand curve, as is
standard in microeconomics. For each value of price p, there is a long-term asymptotic stable total
demand q from all the customers, given by the strictly monotone decreasing function p = P (q).
At a finer granularity, on the “service” side, the charging station problem can be treated as a
multi-server, multi-class, preemptive queuing system with unlimited buffer, and balking and reneg-
ing of customers. It is preemptive since the interruption and rescheduling of charging can be made
in a manner that is transparent to customers. We use the word “class" to refer to the combination
of charging quantity and relative deadline, where relative deadline is the time difference between
the deadline and the current time, i.e., the remaining time till the deadline expires. When a ve-
hicle arrives at the charging station, it observes that the queue length is x. We allow for balking
7
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Figure 2.3: Layered decomposition approach
by supposing that it enters the queue with probability α(x), or, balks with probability 1 − α(x).
Moreover, after a customer has been in the queue for t units of time, it may continue to remain
in the queue with probability β(t), or, renege with probability 1 − β(t). Here α and β are nonin-
creasing functions. If a relative priority is determined for each group, then one obtains a Markov
chain on a high dimensional state space. The total long-term expected revenue can be determined
as a function of price by calculating the steady state distribution of the Markov chain and utilizing
the demand curve. Such an approach however does not lead to a tractable formulation. Hence
we develop an alternative layered model and architecture that is both tractable and implementable.
Before introducing this model, we consider how price discrimination, a common technique used
to capture consumer surplus, works.
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For each class of customer, the company would like to charge a different price. A company
can do this because it has some kind of monopoly power. The charging station market is not pure
competitive as a charging station can provide better service than other charging stations (perhaps
through providing faster charging) and not all charging stations need to be price-takers. Thus,
companies can create several consumer classes and charge different prices to different classes. In
our case, and for simplicity of exposition, let us suppose that consumers can be divided into two
classes: those with a short deadline and those with a longer deadline, both with the same energy
requirement. Customers with long deadlines are more patient than those with early deadlines. If
the charging station offers a price higher than they expect, EVs can simply go to another charging
station. As a result, customers with longer deadlines have more price-elastic demand. On the other
hand, customers with shorter deadlines are not very price-elastic, but could be regarded as being
more deadline-elastic. A common strategy called price discrimination for a profit-maximizing
company is the following: charge a higher price to consumers with smaller price elasticity, and
lower price to consumers more sensitive to price.
The prices could be advertised in various ways, e.g., displayed on a big screen as gas stations
do, thus generating a commensurate total demand since prices are relatively static and not changed
at a high rate.
More generally there can be several customer classes differentiated by charging amounts and
deadlines, with a matrix [Pij] denoting the price for customers with energy requirement Li and
relative deadline dj .
Consider the multi-stage model, where decisions are made on a daily basis. There are two
sources of cost, from the purchase of grid power, and the efficiency loss of the battery. Currently,
most batteries are deep cycle having round-trip efficiencies of about 70-80% [15]. Hence the very
act of storage incurs a cost. Consider the t-th time interval [t, t + 1]. Let S(t) denote the energy
level in the battery at the beginning of the t-th interval, R(t) the total amount of energy generated
by the renewable resource during the interval, G(t) the total amount of energy bought from the
grid, q(t) the total amount of energy used to charge the EVs (assumed equal at this layer to the
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total energy demand of consumers), PG(t) the price of grid power, and P1(t) and P2(t) the prices
charged to customers of the classes. There is a marginal storage cost c associated with the cost
of storing electrical energy in the battery. If we assume constant round-trip efficiency loss and
factor this loss into c, we can reasonably assume c is constant [16] . Also let s0 and smax denote
the initial and maximum levels of the battery. Since S(t) is known causally at the beginning of
this time interval, the goal is to determine how much energy to buy from the grid, as well as how
services to the customer classes are to be priced, so that for a finite time horizon T , the total profit
over the time interval [0, T ] is maximized. We impose a steady-state condition S(T ) = s0 so that
in the long run one does not get infinite energy from the battery as this optimization problem is
repetitively used. One can replace this with any other suitable constraints. In particular one can
replace the lower bound of S(t) with smin if that is deemed preferable.
We assume that the battery capacity is larger than the total possible energy demand [17], the
maximum discharging rate of the battery is bigger than the peak demand rate, and that the marginal
storage cost is less than the wholesale electricity price. We do not impose an upper bound on G(t)
because a typical distribution line has a capacity of 10 MVA [18], which is much bigger than the
maximum possible rate at which the station draws power from the grid (See Section 2.6 for details).
We also assume that price-demand curves for the two classes are both linear: Pj = aj + Qj/bj
for j = 1, 2. Class 1 comprises of those customers with short deadline, i.e., a1 > a2 > 0 and
b2 < b1 < 0.
The resulting discrete optimal control problem [19] is:
max
T−1∑
t=0
2∑
j=1
bjPj(t) (Pj(t)− aj)− c · S(t)− PG(t) ·G(t)
subject to (for t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1):
S(t+ 1)− S(t) = G(t) +R(t)−
2∑
j=1
bj (Pj(t)− aj) , (2.3.0.1)
S(0) = S(T ) = s0,
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0 ≤ S(t) ≤ smax and
0 ≤ P1(t) ≤ a1, 0 ≤ P2(t) ≤ a2, G(t) ≥ 0.
with u(t) := [P1(t), P2(t), G(t)]
′
, let us denote
f0(S(t), u(t)) :=
2∑
j=1
bjPj(t) (Pj(t)− aj)− c · S(t)− PG(t) ·G(t),
f(S(t), u(t)) := G(t) +R(t)−
2∑
j=1
bj (Pj(t)− aj) .
We can replace the lower bound of S(t) with smin if needed for practical reason.
To solve this, we construct the Lagrangian:
L
(
S(0), ..., S(T );u(0), ..., u(T − 1); p(1), ...p(T );λ0, ..., λT ;α0, αT ; γ0, ..., γT )
:=
T−1∑
t=0
f0 (S(t), u(t))−
{
T−1∑
t=0
p(t+ 1) (S(t+ 1)− S(t) −f(S(t), u(t)))
+
T∑
t=0
(λt)
′ · qt(S(t)) + α0(S(0)− s0) +αT (S(T )− s0) +
T−1∑
t=0
(γt)
′
ht(u(t))
}
,
where qt(S(t)) := [−S(t), S(t)− smax]
′
,
ht(u(t)) := [−P1(t), −P2(t), P1(t)− smax, P2(t)− smax, G(t)]
′
.
Suppose S∗(0), ..., S∗(T );u∗(0), ..., u∗(T − 1) is optimal. Then, from the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) condition, there exist p∗(t) ∈ R1,1 ≤ t ≤ T , (λt)∗ ∈ R2, 0 ≤ t ≤ T , (αt)∗ ∈ R1, t = 0, T ,
(γt)∗ ∈ R5, 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, such that
∂L
∂S(t)
= 0, and
∂L
∂u(t)
= 0. (2.3.0.2)
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Denoting λt = [λt1, λ
t
2]
′ and γt = [γt1, γ
t
2, γ
t
3, γ
t
4, γ
t
5]
′ , from complementary slackness:
λt1S(t) = λ
t
2 (S(t)− smax) = 0, t = 0, ..., T.
γt1P1(t) = γ
t
2P2(t) = γ
t
3 (P1(t)− a1) = γt4 (P2(t)− a2) = γt5G(t) = 0,
t = 0, ..., T − 1. (2.3.0.3)
Noting that f0 is a quadratic concave function since b1 and b2 are negative, and that all con-
straints are linear, the solution is unique and a global maximum.
We now show that the earlier method for price discrimination in a static problem (shown in
Fig. ??) also works at every stage. For each stage t, the marginal revenue for class j isMRj(t) =
dTRj(t)/dQj(t) = aj+2Qj(t)/bj = 2Pj(t)−aj [14]. The total cost incurred in stage t is TC(t) =
c · S(t) + PG(t)G(t) = c · S(t) + PG(t) · (S(t+ 1)− S(t)−R(t) +Q(t))+, where (·)+ :=
max(·, 0), Q(t) := ∑2j=1Qj(t), with Q1(t) and Q2(t) denoting the quantities corresponding to
P1(t) and P2(t) on the demand curves for classes 1 and 2. Thus the marginal cost is MC(t) =
d(TC(t))/dQ(t) = PG(t) ·1Q(t)>S(t)+R(t)−S(t+1) = PG(t) ·1G(t)>0, where 1(·) is the characteristic
function.
Theorem 1. Suppose 0 < Pj(t) < aj , for j = 1, 2. Then for each stage t, MR1(t) = MR2(t) =
MC(t) if a strictly positive amount of grid power is bought, i.e., G(t) > 0.
Proof. We expand
∂L
∂u(t)
= 0 from (2.3.0.2). For j = 1, 2
∂L
∂Pj(t)
= 2bjPj(t)− ajbj − bjp(t+ 1) + γtj − γtj+2 = 0,
∂L
∂G(t)
= −PG(t) + p(t+ 1)− γt5 = 0. (2.3.0.4)
Under the assumptions 0 < Pj(t) < aj and G(t) > 0, γi1 = γ
i
2 = γ
i
3 = γ
i
4 = γ
i
5 = 0. Then
from the above, 2P1(t) − a1 = 2P2(t) − a2, which is the same as MR1(t) = MR2(t). Also,
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2P1(t)− a1 = PG(t), which is the same asMR1(t) = MC(t).
From the Lagrange multiplier, we observe the dependence of battery state on the variation of
grid power price. Also, the following theorem shows that when the increase in price is expected to
be greater than the marginal storage cost, then the battery should be charged to the full.
Theorem 2. If S(t− 1) = 0 and PG(t)− PG(t− 1) > c, then S(t) = smax.
Proof. First we notice that if S(t − 1) = 0, then from the previous assumption, the renewable
energy is little and not enough to satisfy the total demand. From the system dynamics equation
(2.3.0.1), we see G(t) > 0. By (2.3.0.3), γt−15 = 0. From (2.3.0.4), we see PG(t− 1)+ γt5 = p(t).
Expanding (2.3.0.2) and substituting in PG(t− 1) = p(t), we have
PG(t)− PG(t− 1) + γt5 + λt1 − λt2 = c.
Clearly, when PG(t) − PG(t − 1) − c > 0, λt1 − λt2 < 0. By complementary slackness, S(t) =
smax.
Section 2.6 presents a numerical example using data from the Electric Reliability Council of
Texas (ERCOT).
2.4 Middle-layer
Now we consider the middle layer where decisions are made every 15 minutes. The total
expected revenue is fixed since the prices have been fixed at the top layer and one day is long
enough for the demand to reach an equilibrium. Therefore to maximize profit, we only need to
minimize expected cost at the middle layer. The number of customers arriving in each stage is a
random variable, with the mean determined by the price-demand curve from the prices announced
at the top layer. For consistency, we assume there are two classes of customers with different
relative deadlines, both requiring the same amount of energy; this can be generalized. It should be
noted that the top layer only determines howmuch electricity on average,G(t), the charging station
should buy from the grid and how much to consume from the battery, Q(t). Since a battery can be
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severely damaged if it is overdrawn or overcharged, a 15-minute charging and discharging policy
needs to be specified. Thus at the middle layer, we determine the optimal policy for 15-minute
operation of the battery, which specifies the amounts to charge (i.e., purchase from the grid) and
discharge (i.e., use for charging EVs).
We adopt the same notation as for the top layer. Let S(t) denote the energy level in the battery,
andX(t) and Y (t) the numbers of customers with relative deadlines of one and two time slots. Let
M(t) denote the random number of customers that arrive in the t-th interval with deadline at the end
of the interval, and N(t) the random number of customers with deadline at the end of the (t+ 1)-
th interval. Let PG(t) denote the random wholesale price in the t-th interval, H(t) the historical
average wholesale electricity price for the t-th interval;G(t) the amount of energy to buy in the t-th
interval,W (t) the amount to discharge, i.e., to use from the battery in the t-th interval. We assume
our charging policy is work-conserving, i.e.,W (t) satisfies L ·X(t) ≤ W (t) ≤ L · (X(t) + Y (t)).
The resulting multi-stage stochastic control problem is
min E
{
T−1∑
t=0
PG(t) ·G(t) + c · S(t)
}
subject to
S(t+ 1) = S(t) +G(t)−W (t), t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1,
X(t+ 1) = X(t) + Y (t)−W (t)/L+M(t+ 1), t = 0, 1, ..., T − 2,
Y (t) = N(t), t = 1, 2, ..T − 1,
M(T − 1) = 0 and N(T − 1) = 0,
S(0) = S(T ) = s0 and 0 ≤ S(t) ≤ smax, t = 0, ..., T,
G(t) ≥ 0, t = 0, ..., T − 1,
L ·X(t) ≤ W (t) ≤ L · (X(t) + Y (t)), t = 0, ..., T − 1,
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M(t) is i.i.d, with E [M(t)] = b2(P2 − a2)/96,
N(t) is i.i.d, with E [N(t)] = b1(P1 − a1)/96,
E [PG(t)] = H(t).
The minimization above is over all Markov policies [3].
Let us define: state space S := {(S,X, Y, PG)}, action space A := {(G,W )} and T :=
{0, 1, ..., T − 1}. Our goal at this layer is to find a policy pi : S×T → A such that for every s ∈ S
and t ∈ T , pit(s) specifies an action inA which minimizes the expected value of the cost function.
For computational purposes we assume that the number of values that M , N and PG can
take is finite. For simplicity, we assume here that M , N , PG are independent; M is i.i.d. with
mean depending on the total quantity associated with the price announced from the top layer; N
is similar toM ; PG’s are independent, with symmetric probability mass functions, each centered
at H(t). However, the general problem is solved similarly. Using dynamic programming [3], the
value function is
Vi(S,X, Y, PG) = min
(G,W )∈A
[
PG ·G(t) + c · S+∑
h∈H
∑
n∈N
∑
m∈M
pM(m)pN(n)pPG(h) · Vi+1 (S +G−W,X + Y −W/L+m,n, h)
]
, (2.4.0.1)
VT (S,X, Y, PG) = c · S.
where pM , pN and pPG are probability mass functions ofM , N and PG, respectively;M, N and
H are the finite sets of values thatM , N and PG can take, respectively.
To get a closed form solution of the value function V is difficult. As we recurse backwards
from stage T , we notice that to satisfy (2.4.0.1), the value function V is piecewise, but the number
of pieces of V grows. As a consequence, instead of deriving the necessary condition for the optimal
policy by exploiting the properties of V , we employ a numerical algorithm to derive the optimal
policy, illustrated in Section 2.6 for a numerical example following the results from top-layer.
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2.5 Bottom-layer
In the bottom layer, the lookup table obtained at the middle layer, which consists of the optimal
actions (G,W ) for every possible state (S,X, Y, PG) at each time t, is used as a guideline for the
scheduling problem. The amount to use from the batteryW in each time interval, which is derived
from the middle layer, equals the total amount of energy discharged from the battery during that
interval. This sets an equality constraint for the bottom layer. We seek a real-time scheduling
policy which explicitly prioritizes different classes of customers while satisfying the total energy
consumption constraints and ensuring that no deadlines are missed. While finding the optimal
real-time scheduling policy is not trivial, it is straightforward if the following assumptions hold:
• The charging rate for each charger is large enough that all requests can always be finished
within one time slot. This is true if the discharging rate of the battery is large enough.
• The number of chargers is large enough so that whenever it is decided to charge a EV, there
is an empty charger. This is feasible if the former assumption is made.
• The deadline for EVs that arrived in (t − 1, t] with a relative deadline of d is t + d, for
d = 1, 2.
Wholesale electricity prices are typically announced every 15 minutes, as is done by ERCOT in
Texas for example. Neglecting the initial opening period for the operation of the charging station,
the prescription for the middle layer can be implemented in the following manner to yield the
policy for the bottom layer:
During (t− 1, t]:
• Keep track of EVs that arrived in (t− 1, t].
At time t:
1. Obtain the latest grid power price on the website for the period (t− 1, t].
2. Read the current energy level of the battery S(t).
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3. Determine the optimal actionW (S(t), X(t), Y (t), PG(t), t) from the middle layer and fol-
low it to charge the EVs that arrived in (t− 1, t], i.e., ifW = X , charge all the EVs with one
time slot relative deadline; ifW = X + Y , charge the EVs with a relative deadline of either
one slot or two slots at the same time; ifX < W < X + Y , charge all the EVs with one slot
relative deadline and then charge (W −X)/L EVs with two slots relative deadline.
2.6 Numerical Results
2.6.1 Top-layer
We use data from ERCOT [20] and the wholesale electricity prices of Houston, from Jan. 1
– 30, 2012, as PG(t). From [20, 21], onsite renewable energy generation is random and only
accounts for 5 to 10 percent of the total demand. Therefore, we generate a random vector in that
range and fix it throughout the example. Moreover, we assume the typical battery capacity of
an EV is 16 kWh [22] and that every consumer arrives with an empty battery and requires a full
charge. For gasoline demand, the typical short term elasticity lies between 0.12 to 0.25 [14]; so we
use 0.15 and 0.25 as the elasticities of demand for urgent consumers and non-urgent consumers.
We present the results in Fig. 2.4. All the curves are normalized so they do not overlap with
each other. Compared with the daily average wholesale electricity price PG(t), the announced
prices P1(t) and P2(t) have relatively less fluctuation. This is because, from Theorem 1, the
marginal revenues of the two classes are both equal to the marginal cost, which is the grid power
price. It turns out that the charging price lies very close to the average of the highest possible price
that can be charged and the wholesale electricity price. In Fig. 2.5 we present the storage level as a
percentage of the battery’s capacity. We see that whenever the grid power price is known to rise in
the next period, a large amount of power is bought from the grid, resulting in a full battery in the
next period. Then, in the next period, all the charging requirement is fulfilled by the battery, that
is, the amount bought from the grid is zero.
With the development of smart phones, it is relatively easy for an EV driver to have access to
charging station prices in real-time. Therefore, the old fashioned gasoline pricing scheme, where
price is changed on a daily basis, needs to be reexamined. Using the same data, we show in Fig.
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Figure 2.4: Numerical result of top layer
2.6 how the total profit changes with respect to the frequency at which prices are announced by
the charging station. The horizontal axis represents the price change period, i.e., the x-coordinate
12 represents the total profit in January if price is changed every 12 hours. The total profit is of
course a decreasing function of changing price period; the total profit obtained by announcing the
price every 2 hours is larger than the profit obtained by changing the price daily, because the daily
average of wholesale electricity price cancels out the possible volatility of price during the day. A
more frequent change of pricing scheme results in a better utilization of the battery and thus earns
a larger profit.
2.6.2 Middle-layer
In the example, we assume that the numbers of customers arriving with relative deadlines of
one and two slots are both uniformly distributed. We consider the probability mass function of the
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Figure 2.5: Battery level, grid power price and amount of grid power purchase for days 10− 18.
Table 2.1: Probability mass function of grid power price in each interval
Value H − 2 H − 1 H H + 1 H + 2
Probability 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.1
wholesale electricity price shown in Table 2.1. We take |S|= |H|= 20, |M|= |N |= 5. Because
we require that no deadlines should be missed, the size of the action space is |A|≤ |N ||S|. We use
discrete dynamic programming to solve this problem. Going backwards, we obtain a look-up table
containing all the optimal actions - how much to buy from grid and how much to use to charge
the EVs - specified for every possible state in each stage. This optimization has a time horizon
of one day and needs to run on a daily basis after the price is determined from the top layer. For
illustration purposes, we analyze eight 15-minute intervals, from Jan. 9, 9am to 11am. We use the
wholesale electricity price data from ERCOT, Houston.
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Figure 2.6: Total profit in January as a function of the periodicity of price change.
To illustrate the optimal policy, we exhibit a single sample path in Fig. 2.7. In the figure, D(t)
is the total charging requirement – the sum of energy required by customers with relative deadlines
of one time slot and two slots. On this sample path, the maximum rate at which the station draws
power from the grid is 2 MWh, which happens at t = 1. This justifies the assumption that the
upper bound on G(t) can be ignored.
During the first five intervals, D(t) and W (t) coincide, which means that all the requests are
fulfilled even if the relative deadline is two time slots. Consider for example t = 3. The battery is
full, responding to the rise of grid power price during the first two intervals. There is no need to
buy from the grid and the best one can do is to fulfill all the pending requests. However at t = 6,
W (t) < D(t), which means that requests of customers with a relative deadline of two slots are
deferred to the next interval. This may result from the fact that the grid power price is high but
the battery level is low, since fulfilling the requests of both classes will necessitate buying a lot of
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Figure 2.7: The evolution of the optimal policy for a specific sample path
Table 2.2: Average costs of different policies
Policy Name Conservative Radical Optimal
Average Cost ($) 156.9 157.8 152.8
expensive energy from the grid.
We also compare the performance of the optimal policy against two simple policies, one “con-
servative” and the other “radical”. The conservative policy always fulfills all charging requests
immediately, even those with a relative deadline of two time slots. The radical policy fulfills only
those requests needing to be attended to at the moment – deferring all the requests with relative
deadline of two time slots to the next interval. Table 2.2 shows the average costs incurred by the
three policies. Clearly, by incorporating the anticipation of future wholesale electricity prices and
number of customers arriving into its planning, the optimal policy is able to do the best job.
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2.7 Computation complexity
We now examine the computational complexity of the above approach in the general setting.
In the top layer, there are altogether (3K+6)N+5 variables to solve, whereK = |I|×|J | denotes
the number of entries in the price matrix P . The resulting quadratic programming problem is com-
putationally feasible for reasonable values of K and N , using CPLEX [23]. At the middle layer,
the number of discrete values for each variable directly influences computational complexity. The
time complexity is O
(
(n× |S|2×|H|×∏Jj=1∏Ii=1 cij)N). Here I and J are the numbers of rows
and column in the price matrix P respectively, with |I|×|J |= K; Cij is the the set of values that the
number of ij-th class customers’ arrivals can take and cij = |Cij|; n =
∑J
j=1
∑I
i=1maxp∈Cij {p}.
Clearly, this is polynomial in the number of stages N ; however, it is extremely sensitive to how
finely we discretize the state and action spaces, as one may expect.
2.8 The Cost of the Layered Policy and the Value of Battery
The above analysis guarantees that the architectural solution is implementable in the real-time
market operation of an EV charging station. However, as the time-scale decomposition is only
a suboptimal solution of the overall stochastic scheduling problem, another important aspect is
to evaluate the performance of the approach, and to determine if the architectural decomposition
incurs a significant loss of profit. An upper bound on the total profit can be obtained by optimizing
the top layer assuming full future information, including wholesale electricity price and renewable
generation, and changing the announced price every 15 minutes. Running the top layer once on
Jan. 1 with a horizon of 14 days, middle layer at 12:00 am everyday with a horizon of 1 day, and
bottom layer every 15 minutes shows that the total profit obtained by our top layer achieves 90.2%
of the upper bound. The middle and bottom layer together however reduce the cost and improve
the ratio to 92.6%. We also run the above algorithm from Jan. 2 to Jan. 10. The results are shown
in Fig. 2.8. It can be seen that the layered algorithm achieves 90% of the upper bound in all cases.
A higher ratio is realized on days when wholesale electricity price has small variance. This is true
if we look at the probability mass function of electricity price in our simulation. As a result, it can
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Figure 2.8: The ratio of total profit obtained by the layered algorithm to its upper bound
be concluded that the architectural solution, with three layers serving for monthly planning, daily
adjustment and real-time scheduling respectively, does not lose much with respect to optimality.
The fixed cost and the operating cost of the battery are both high. As a result, we need to justify
the benefit of introducing a battery in the charging station. We first set smax = 0 and calculate the
upper bound of the total profit in January in the same way as we do in the optimality test above.
This gives us the maximum possible total profit in January without the battery. Not surprisingly, the
total profit obtained by our algorithm in the presence of a battery is 30.2% more than the maximal
achievable profit without a battery. Similarly, we run the simulation for February and all the way
to December. The results are shown in Fig. 2.9. From the figure we can see that the maximal
achievable profit without a battery is less than the profit with a battery for every month of 2012.
During the months of July and August (summer in Texas), the difference is even bigger because
wholesale electricity has bigger fluctuations during that time. These differences, as a consequence,
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Figure 2.9: Total profit comparisons with and without battery
will definitely cover the fixed cost of the battery in the long run and therefore we conclude that it
is beneficial for the charging station owner to introduce a battery into the system.
We also obtain numerical results of how total profit in January changes as battery capacity
increases. The results are shown in Fig. 2.10. We see that as capacity increases, marginal benefit
decreases. Thus if the fixed cost of the battery is factored in, we may expect an optimal battery
capacity to be chosen at the level that maximizes rate of return.
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Figure 2.10: Total profit as a function of battery capacity
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3. OPTIMAL MARKET OPERATION WITH DER FLEXIBILITIES: PROBLEM
FORMULATION AND SOLUTION CONCEPT ∗
3.1 Introduction
In electric power systems, a key role is played by the grip operator, an entity called the Sys-
tem Operator or Independent System Operator (ISO). There are a number of unique challenges
faced by the electricity grid operator: production has to be simultaneous with demand; the costs
of different generating units vary significantly; and expected and unexpected conditions on the
transmission network affect the selection of which generating units should be used to serve load
reliably. Traditionally, given the demand of the loads (or a forecast), the role of the ISO, taking into
account these factors, is to allocate the required power among generators such that power is reli-
ably delivered to meet demand, and the cost of generation is minimized. This security constrained
unit commitment (SCUC) [24] and economic dispatch (SCED) [25] problem can be solved by so-
liciting bids (marginal cost of production curve) from each producer and then, choosing for each
hour which generator should be committed to be on-line and the output level of the corresponding
on-line generators, typically for the next 24-hour period, such that the overall cost of producing
the power demanded is minimized [26]. In real time, given the actual load and grid conditions, the
ISO must decide the production level at which each available resource from the unit commitment
stage should be operated such that overall production costs are minimized while maintaining re-
liability [27]. Adjustment of dispatch is needed because actual conditions may be different from
those forecasted in the day-ahead commitment.
The above model with a fixed demand is insufficient for power systems nowadays when re-
newable power generation is integrated in the system. When employing renewable energy, such
as solar and wind which vary unpredictably with time, demand needs to be adjusted accordingly
to match the availability of renewable energy [28]. ISO allows this additional flexibility of loads
∗Part of this Chapter is reprinted with permission from "A Theory for the Economic Operation of a Smart Grid
with Stochastic Renewables, Demand Response and Storage" by Rahul Singh, KeMa, AnupamA. Thatte, P. R. Kumar,
and Le Xie in in 2015 54th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 3778-3785, Dec 2015.
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to enter the system by introducing demand bids submitted by Load Serving Entities (LSEs) dur-
ing the SCUC and SCED processes. LSEs, who have traditionally been electric utilities∗, secure
energy and transmission service (and related Interconnect Operations Services [30]) to serve the
electrical demand and energy requirements of their end-users and wholesale customers. Similar
to the dispatch problem stated above, there are two stages, or time periods, where bids from both
generators and LSEs clear: day-ahead market and real-time market. The day-ahead energy market
lets market participants commit to buy or sell wholesale electricity one day before the operating
day, where SCUC and SCED are performed to satisfy energy demand bids and to ensure adequate
scheduling of resources to meet next day’s anticipated load. The real-time energy market lets mar-
ket participants buy and sell wholesale electricity during the course of the operating day to balance
the differences between day-ahead commitments and the actual real-time demand and production
[31].
In reality, prices resulting from clearing the bids in both day-ahead and real-time markets are
not identical across different locations. This is due to physical limits of the transmission systems,
such as congestions and line losses. Prices at different locations, called Locational Marginal Prices
(LMPs), reflect the operating characteristics of and the major constraints on the transmission sys-
tem at different locations as well as losses resulting from physical limits of the transmission system.
LMPs are widely used for collecting transmission congestion charges and determining compensa-
tion for holders of Financial Transmission Rights [31].
However, in the above design of both day-ahead market and real-time market, an important fact
is neglected: power generators and loads are both dynamic systems with individual constraints. For
example, one of the most important features of fossil fuel generators is a ramping constraint: there
is a limit of increase or decrease of output level between two consecutive time intervals. Similarly,
air conditioners can be deferred for a relatively short amount of time but not indefinitely, making
loads dynamic systems. Hence both generators and loads, which may be aggregations of many
small loads, need to be modeled as dynamic stochastic systems. All variables, including power
∗This may change in the future as new business models arise and the traditional model of utilities also undergoes
a transformation [29].
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output and demand, are functions of time. Marketing clearing prices (LMPs), on the other hands,
are functions of both time and location.
In this chapter, we consider the resulting problem faced by the ISO, called the ISO Problem.
How should the ISO choose price as function of both time and locations, such that the sum of utili-
ties of all agents in the system is maximized, while maintaining the balance of supply and demand
and satisfying network constraints. The sum of the utilities of all agents is simply the benefit of
power consumption by the consumers, minus the cost of power generated by the generators, and
it is called the social welfare. Because of the competitive nature of commercial producers and the
need to protect privacy of consumers, the desired solution needs to be decentralized: the ISO needs
to operate without knowing the states/utilities/dynamics of the agents, and agents should also not
need to know states/utilities/dynamics of each other. The only sharing of information happening
between agents and the ISO and is restricted to the bidding process between the ISO and the agents
in each time period (which could be a 15 minute period, or a 5 minute period, or a 24 hour pe-
riod). This bidding process can be one-shot, or a sequence. The sequential case is considered in
[32], where the ISO announces a sequence of tentative market clearing prices over time and loca-
tions, and agents respond back with their supply/consumption bids over time with respect to the
prices. This iterative process continues until the price sequences converges, and this entire process
is repeated in each time period. The complexity of iterating on price vector over time instead of
price for one time instant is inevitable if agents do not share their states/utilities/dynamics with
the ISO. It is worth noting that similar to the tatonnement process in general equilibrium theory
[33], the system-level utility maximization problem faced by the ISO is conducted by agents in a
distributed manner, coupled only by the prices announced by the ISO. We need to mention that
in this Chapter we are only considering the non-strategic case, where agents always bid truthfully.
In [34], we have considered the case where the network constraint are absent and thus prices are
identical across different locations and in [32] the authors mention that linear constraints can be in-
corporated in the LQG case. We will consider here a complete system-wide dynamic optimization
problem faced by the ISO with both energy balancing constraints and network constraints.
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We examine both deterministic and stochastic models, which suit well the day-ahead and real-
time markets, respectively. For deterministic model, our dynamic solution leads to a social welfare
maximum under convexity assumptions of the utility functions. It is not restricted to linearity of
system or quadraticity of costs. For the stochastic model, we investigate the case where agents are
modeled as linear Gaussian systems and the cost functions are quadratic. It can be shown that a
simple scheme yields the global optimum [35]. Under this policy, each agent i needs only to track
its present stateXi(t) instead of the entire history, as in the general case of decentralized stochastic
control [36].
We compare our multi-period formulation with a single-period formulation via simulation. It
is shown that our iterative bidding solution achieves a higher social welfare than the hour-by-
hour (15-minute-by-15-minute) single-period bidding process in the day-ahead market (real-time
market).
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, a survey of related works is
presented. This is followed by a complete description of the model and problem in Sections 3.3.
Discussions of the iterative bidding scheme in a deterministic setting and a stochastic setting are
presented in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, respectively. Numerical results are provided in Section
3.6.
3.2 Related Works
There have been many papers addressing the problem of dynamic pricing for demand response
assuming a known demand function. Borenstein, Jaske, and Rosenfield [37] present an overview
and analysis of the possible approaches to bringing an active demand side into electricity markets.
Borenstein [38] continues the study by focusing on the long-run efficiency gains from adopting
real-time pricing (RTP) in a competitive electricity market. Using simple simulations with realistic
parameters, the author demonstrates that the magnitude of efficiency gains from RTP is likely to
be significant even if demand shows very little elasticity. Carrion, Conejo, and Arroyo propose a
risk-constrained stochastic programming framework to decide which forward contracts the retailer
should sign, and at which price it must sell electricity, so that its expected profit is maximized at
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a given risk level [39]. Conejo et al. [40] further address the optimal involvement in a futures
electricity market of a power producer to hedge against the risk of pool price volatility. These
results, however, assume implicitly that the demand function is known.
Closer to our work, there is an extensive line of work focusing on obtaining the optimal market
prices which maximizes the social welfare of a collection of loads. Joo and Ilic [41] propose a dis-
tributed optimization algorithm to solve the social welfare maximization problemwith a three-layer
market structure (loads at the bottom, LSE at the middle, and the ISO at the top). By examining the
relationships between the global objectives and the local objectives in different layers, the authors
propose a set of conditions that guarantees the convergence of the algorithm. In [42], a dynamic
model of the wholesale energy market that incorporates renewable resources and real-time pricing
with demand response is proposed, and conditions under which stability of the market can be guar-
anteed are derived. Thomas and Tesfatsion [43] show that dynamic-price retail contracting can
give rise to braided cobweb dynamics consisting of two interwoven cycles for power and price lev-
els exhibiting either stability or instability depending on system conditions. The classic paper [44]
develops a theory of pricing in electrical networks over space and time; however the system model
does not incorporate dynamics of agents. To the authors’ knowledge there do not appear to be any
similar results for achieving optimal social welfare over a time period in a decentralized manner,
in a smart grid consisting of network constraints and dynamic generators and loads with stochastic
uncertainties. We show that our iterative bidding scheme achieves a higher social welfare than the
single-period bidding scheme.
3.3 Problem Formulation
We consider a smart grid consisting of N agents, which may be either producers or consumers
of electricity. We model time as consisting of discrete periods and each period corresponds to,
say, a 1-hour interval of the day-ahead market. Since we consider the problem from the ISO level,
each load bus (agent) is represented by an aggregate LSE model. Details of how to obtain such an
aggregate model are not the focus of this thesis, and the reader is referred to [45], [46] and [47].
Each agent i is modeled as a dynamic system. The motivation is that generators typically have
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ramping constraints, and consumers behind each LSE may have similar ramping constraint as well
as delays in load dynamics. The state of agent i at time t, denoted as xi(t), evolves as,
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), t = 0, 1, ..., T − 1. (3.3.0.1)
where ui(t) is the amount of energy (or equivalently, average interval power) each agent i supplies
or obtains to the grid at time t. ui(t) > 0 stands for supplying energy to the grid by agent i at time
t, while ui(t) < 0 signifies an energy consumption by agent i. A straightforward and important
constraint is that there must be a power balance at each time over the grid:
∑N
i=1 ui(t) = 0 for
all t. In addition, network constraints posed by the underlying power-flow equations need to be
incorporated. Here, for simplicity, we adopt the simplified direct-current (DC) power flow method,
which yields fast estimate of line power flows on an AC power system, to specify the network
constraints. A nonlinear model of the AC system is simplified to a linear model of DC power flow
if the following assumptions hold [48]:
• Line resistances (active power losses) are negligible, i.e. R≪ X .
• Magnitudes of bus voltages are set to 1 per unit.
• Voltage angle differences are small, i.e. sin(θ) ≈ θ and cos(θ) ≈ 1.
Based on the above assumptions, voltage angles θi are the variables to solve given active power
injections Pi in advance. Without loss of generality, we assume agents are geographically located
at N different buses, which results in Pi = ui. Under a DC flow assumption, the active power
balance equations reduce to a set of linear equations:
ui =
N∑
j=1
Bij(θi − θj),
where Bij is the susceptance between bus i and j, or the imaginary part of the bus admittance
matrix Yij . As a result, active power flow through transmission line li between bus j and k can be
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calculated as:
Pli =
θj − θk
Xli
.
whereXli is the reactance of line li. DC power flow equations in matrix form and the corresponding
matrix relation for flows through branches are represented in (3.3.0.2) and (3.3.0.3).
Θ = B−1U, (3.3.0.2)
Pl = DAΘ, (3.3.0.3)
where
U := (u1, u2, ..., uN)
T is the vector of bus active power injections for buses 1, ..., N ,
B ∈ RN×N is a matrix whose non-diagonal elements are susceptances and diagonal elements
are the sum of non-diagonal elements in the same row,
Θ ∈ RN×1 is the vector of bus voltage angles for buses 1, ..., N ,
Pl ∈ RM×1 is the vector of branch flows (M is the number of branches),
D ∈ RM×M is a diagonal matrix with dkk equal to the negative susceptance of line k,
A ∈ RM×N is the bus-branch incidence matrix.
Substituting (3.3.0.2) into (3.3.0.3), we have:
Pl = DAB
−1U = HU. (3.3.0.4)
where H := DAB−1 is an M × N matrix that maps active power injection at buses onto active
power flow on branches. Here we note that the condition
∑N
i=1 ui = 0 takes care of the issue of
slack bus, since the slack bus is created solely to balance the active power in the system. A natural
constraint on the active power flow on a transmission line is HU ≤ C, where C is the vector of
active power flow limits of the branches in the system. We note that this inequality takes care of the
direction of flows since |HU |≤ C can be equivalently written as H ′U ≤ C where H ′ =
 H
−H
.
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Note that in this chapter, we do not consider line losses, assuming losses are not significant enough
to impact the economics of the system operation. However, our model could be generalized to
include these constraints.
We suppose that each agent i has a stage-wise utility function Fi(xi(t), ui(t)). For producers,
this could be the negative of the cost of production. We assume that Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) is the aggregate
total utility of all the loads connected to the LSE. The total utility of agent i over the time horizon
{0, ..., T−1} is∑T−1t=0 Fi(xi(t), ui(t)). There could be constraints on input ui for model (4.3.0.11),
such as a ramp constraints |ui(t+1)−ui(t)|≤ ri. In that case, these constraints are not dualized in
the sequel, but carry over to the dual. For simplicity we will not explicitly consider this case here,
but will incorporate such constraints in the numerical examples in Section 3.6.
With the above set-up, we are led to the following deterministic social welfare maximization
problem (DA for day-ahead):
max
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t))
subject to
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for t = 0, ..., T − 1,
HU(t) ≤ C, for t = 0, ..., T − 1,
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), for i = 1, ..., N, t = 0, ..., T − 1.
where U(t) := (u1(t), u2(t), ..., uN(t))T . This model automatically takes care of renewable re-
sources and uncontrollable loads since we can take Fi ≡ 0 and ui(t) as the prediction value over
the next 24 hours.
Because commercial producers are competitive and the privacy of consumers must be pro-
tected, the desired solution needs to be decentralized. In Sections 3.4 and 3.5, for the deterministic
case (day-ahead market) and stochastic case (real-time market) respectively, we will derive al-
gorithms that satisfy information and action decentralization, with communications between ISO
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and agents restricted to ISO announcing a sequence of prices and agents responding with sup-
ply/consumption bids in response to prices.
3.4 Deterministic Case: Day-ahead Market
In the day-ahead (DA) market scenario, the ISO’s task is to determinine the T -dimensional vec-
torsUi := (ui(0), ui(1), ..., ui(T − 1)), for i = 1, 2, ..., N , such that the social welfare
∑N
i=1
∑T−1
t=0 Fi(xi(t), ui(t))
is maximized. We start by writing the Lagrangian for the DA problem:
L(U1, U2, ..., UN , λ, µ) :=
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t))
+
T−1∑
t=0
λ(t)
(
N∑
i=1
ui(t)
)
−
T−1∑
t=0
µT (t) (HU(t)− C) ,
(3.4.0.1)
where λ := (λ(0), λ(1), ..., λ(T − 1)) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with energy balance
constraints, and µ := (µ(0), µ(1), ..., µ(T − 1)) are the Lagrange multipliers associated with the
line constraints. The Lagrange dual function is,
D(λ, µ) := max
U1,U2,...,UN
L(U1, U2, ..., UN , λ, µ)
= max
U1,U2,...,UN
N∑
i=1
( T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) + λ(t)ui(t)− µT (t)Hiui(t)
)
+
T∑
i=1
µT (t) · C
= max
U1,U2,...,UN
N∑
i=1
( T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) + (λ(t)− µT (t)Hi)ui(t)
)
+
T−1∑
t=0
µT (t) · C,
(3.4.0.2)
where Hi ∈ RM×1 is the i-th column of matrix H . The Lagrange dual function (3.4.0.2) can be
decomposed agent-by-agent since they are only coupled by price (λ(t)− µT (t)Hi). Note that the
obtained price coincides with the locational marginal price (LMP) defined in [31], with λ being the
energy component and µT (t)Hi being the congestion component (the loss component is missing
because we do not consider line losses in the model). Because of the existence of the µT (t)Hi
term, different locations (agents) receive different prices. As a result, prices here are functions of
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both time and location. We consider the decomposed optimization problem faced by agent i:
max
Ui
T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) + (λ(t)− µT (t)Hi)ui(t), (3.4.0.3)
subject to:
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), t = 0, ..., T − 1.
It maximizes agent i’s total net utility, defined as the utility Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) plus the amount (λ(t)−
µT (t)Hi)ui(t) it pays/gets paid for electricity. The optimal cost is a function of the initial condition
and the Lagrange multiplier sequence (λ, µ), and we denote it Vi(xi(0), λ, µ). Therefore,
D(λ, µ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi(xi(0), λ, µ) + C
Tµ · eT
where eT = (1, 1, ..., 1)T is a T -dimensional vector. The term CTµ · eT is commonly referred to as
ISO surplus [49] or congestion rent [50]. When LMPs are different across the grid, the prices paid
by wholesale consumers can diverge from the prices paid to generators. The difference between
total consumer payments and total seller receipts is a net earnings stream collected and allocated
by the ISO. When grids are modeled as lossless, LMP separation only arises in the presence of
congestion: when at least one of the branches lj reaches its capacity cj (congestion happens)
at time t, the corresponding Lagrange multiplier becomes positive with µj(t) > 0, resulting in
CTµ · eT > 0.
Since the dual function can be decomposed by agents, we observe that solving the dual problem
leads us to a decentralized problem: The ISO first announces different price vectors to different
agents with (λ(t) − µT (t)Hi), t = 1, ..., T being sent to agent i. Each agent i optimizes its own
objectives (3.4.0.3) by choosing the vector Ui. As a consequence, neither ISO nor the other agents
need to know the utilities/states/dynamics of agent i. The dual problem is:
min D(λ, µ) (3.4.0.4)
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subject to
µ(0), µ(1), ...µ(T − 1) ≥ 0.
We will assume strong duality holds, i.e., the optimal value of the DA problem and problem
(3.4.0.4) are equal. One possible sufficient condition is that the function
∑T−1
t=0 Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) is
concave in the input vector Ui, for i = 1, ..., N and the feasible region of problem DA is nonempty.
We require concavity only in the input vector Ui because xi(t) can be expressed in terms of the
inputs Ui = (ui(0), ..., ui(T−1)) and thus the utility function
∑N
i=1
∑T−1
t=0 Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) can also
be expressed solely as a function of the inputs Ui, i = 1, ..., N .
The problem faced by the ISO is how to determine the optimal price vector (λ∗, µ∗) such that
D(λ, µ) is minimized. Since D(λ, µ) is convex in λ and µ, we consider the use of subgradient for
iterating on the price vector (λ, µ) in order to converge to the optimal (λ∗, µ∗) [51]:
∂D
∂λ
=
(
N∑
i=1
u
(λ,µ)
i (0),
N∑
i=1
u
(λ,µ)
i (1), ...,
N∑
i=1
u
(λ,µ)
i (T − 1)
)
, (3.4.0.5)
∂D
∂µ(t)
= −(U (λ,µ))T (t) ·HT + CT . (3.4.0.6)
where U (λ,µ)i :=
(
u
(λ,µ)
i (1), u
(λ,µ)
i (2), ..., u
(λ,µ)
i (T )
)
is the vector that achieves the maximal utility
for the i-th agent for the price vector (λ, µ) in (3.4.0.3), U (λ,µ)(t) := (u(λ,µ)1 (t), u
(λ,µ)
2 (t),
..., u
(λ,µ)
N (t)). Note that agent i will not receive the vector (λ, µ), but rather (λ − µTHi). Here for
simplicity of exposition, we denote U(
λ+µTHi)
i as U
(λ,µ)
i .
We thus obtains the price iteration Algorithm 1.
There are several choices for αk, and corresponding convergence results for the resulting sub-
gradient method [52].
Compared with the single-period scheme, our multi-period formulation achieves a higher social
welfare because single-period scheme is mathematically equivalent to a multi-period formulation
with additional constraints on U(t), which results in a smaller feasible set.
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Algorithm 1: Iterative bidding algorithm for DA problem
k = 0; Initialize (λ, µ)k to some arbitrary value;
repeat
Each agent i solves the problem
max
Ui
T−1∑
t=0
[
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) + (λ(t)− µT (t)Hi)ui(t)
]
,
subject to
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), t = 0, ..., T − 1.
and submit their bids U (λ,µ)
k
i , to the ISO.
ISO then updates the price vector, for t = 0, ..., T − 1
λk+1 = λk − αk
(
N∑
i=1
U
(λ,µ)k
i
)
,
µ(t)k+1 = max
(
µ(t)k + αk
(
HU (λ,µ)
k
(t)− C
)
, 0
)
.
k = k + 1.
until (λ, µ)k converges to (λ, µ)∗;
3.5 Stochastic Case: Real-time Market
In the previous section, the dynamics of the agents (4.3.0.11) were assumed to be determin-
istic, i.e., system state at the next time instant t + 1 was completely determined by the state and
input at time t. However, this might be unrealistic when considering the stochastic nature of re-
newable energy as well as consumer demands, especially in the real-time market context. Let
ωi = (ωi(1), ωi(2), ..., ωi(T )) be the “private" stochastic process affecting only agent i’s system
via:
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t), ωi(t)),
The stochastic process ωi is not completely observed by the other agents, and only agent i knows
the law, i.e., the probability distribution, of ωi. The social welfare maximization problem faced by
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the ISO (RT for real-time):
max E
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t))
subject to
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for t = 0, ..., T − 1,
HU(t) ≤ C, for t = 0, ..., T − 1,
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t), wi(t)), for t = 0, ..., T − 1.
If the goal of the ISO is to optimize social welfare over all decentralized policies, then the ISO
needs to play a more active role in order to induce cooperation among agents: the ISO needs to
know states/utility/dynamics of each individual agent i as well as the probability distribution of its
privately observed process ωi. Then the ISO could use dynamic programming to decide the optimal
U(t) for each t, as a function of the states of the entire system. As is well known, this method
suffers from the curse of dimensionality as N increases. An optimal decentralized solution to the
RT problem however, remains an open problem and [34] presents two approximation algorithms
with reduced complexities.
In order to simplify the algorithm and at the same time maintain the iterative bidding structure,
we consider the special case of the RT problem when all agents have linear dynamics, with Gaus-
sian noises, and quadratic costs. The noises ωi are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean
zero. Each agent i has a quadratic utility: Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = qixi(t)2 + riui(t)2 with qi ≤ 0 and
ri < 0. We have the constrained LQG (CLQG) problem:
max E
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
(
qixi(t)
2 + riui(t)
2
)
subject to
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N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for t = 0, ..., T − 1, (3.5.0.1)
HU(t) ≤ C, for t = 0, ..., T − 1, (3.5.0.2)
xi(t+ 1) = aixi(t) + biui(t) + ωi(t), for t = 0, ..., T − 1.
We will assume the same information sharing structure as in the DA problem: system dynamics
given by (ai, bi) and cost functions given by (qi, ri) are all private to agent i and communications
between ISO and agents are restricted to ISO announcing a sequence of prices and agents returning
back with supply/consumption bids in response to prices.
Similar to the bidding solution of the DA problem, we propose an iterative bidding scheme for
the CLQG problem: At time s, ISO first declares a price vector (λ(t) − µT (t)Hi) for agent i for
times t ≥ s. Agent i responds back with u(λ,µ)i for t ≥ s. That is, at time s, each agent bids a
vector of future supply/consumption in responses to future prices announced by the ISO, and ISO
updates the prices in return, until convergence.
The key to showing the existence of such simple bidding scheme lies in the certainty equiva-
lence property of unconstrained LQG systems [36]: A stochastic control problem is said to posses
the property of certainty equivalence if the optimal policy for the stochastic control problem co-
incides with the optimal policy for the corresponding deterministic control problem in which the
noise is absent. However, we need to be careful applying the property because certainty equiva-
lence does not hold for generally constrained LQG problem. Fortunately, constraints (3.5.0.1) and
(3.5.0.2) are both linear in U and as [53] and [54] point out, certainty equivalence continues to hold
for LQG problems with linear constraints in U . Thus we obtain the iterative Algorithm 2.
The critical feature of Algorithm 2 is that there is an iteration of bids in response to future
prices at each time s and once the price converges, the agents implement the control at only the
first time instant.
It should be noted that since the current optimal supply/consumption depends on future prices,
iteration of price at only one time instant is not sufficient to guarantee optimal decision when agents
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Algorithm 2: Iterative bidding algorithm for CLQG problem
for time s = 0 to T − 1 do
k = 0; Initialize (λ, µ)k for t ≥ s to some arbitrary value;
repeat
Each agent i solves the problem
max
T−1∑
t=s
[
qixi(t)
2 + riui(t)
2
+ (λ(t)− µT (t)Hi)ui(t)
]
,
subject to
xi(t+ 1) = f
t
i (xi(t), ui(t)), t = 0, ..., T − 1.
and submit their bids u(λ,µ)
k
i , t ≥ s to the ISO.
ISO then updates the price vector
λk+1 = λk − αk
(
N∑
i=1
U
(λ,µ)k
i
)
, t ≥ s.
µ(t)k+1 = max
(
µ(t)k + αk(HU
(λ,µ)k(t)− C), 0
)
,
t ≥ s.
k = k + 1.
until (λ, µ)k converges to (λ, µ)∗;
Implement U∗(s)
end
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are dynamic systems. Please see Section 3.6 for detailed discussion.
3.6 Numerical Results
We illustrate the iterative Algorithms 1 and 2 by simple examples. We start with a deterministic
case, followed by a stochastic case. We consider the 30-bus system detailed in [55], with generator
data given in Appendix D.4 of [56] that includes data on the generators’ cost coefficients and ramp
rate limits. There are 9 generators and 21 LSEs in the system, which we assume are located at 30
distinct buses.
3.6.1 Deterministic dynamic case: An example
Without loss of generality, we assume linear dynamic systems and quadratic concave utilities
for agents in the following example. For LSE i, we adopt the virtual battery model [57] and let
xi(t) denote the state of charge (SOC) at time t that evolves as,
xi(t+ 1) = αixi(t) + βihi(t)− γiui(t),
where hi(t) denotes ambient heating (ambient temperature forecast) and 0 ≤ xi(t) ≤ 1. For a
supplier i, xi(t) denotes the accumulated power production up to time t, and ui(t) denotes the
power production level at time t. State xi(t) evolves as,
xi(t+ 1) = αixi(t) + ui(t),
ui ≤ ui(t) ≤ u¯i, for t = 0, ..., T − 1.
−ri ≤ ui(t+ 1)− ui(t) ≤ ri, for t = 0, ..., T − 2,
where ui and u¯i are the minimum and maximum power production levels, respectively, and ri is
the maximal ramp rate allowed. For LSE i, let utility
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = −
(
xi(t)− 1
2
(φ1i + φ2i)
)2
+mi,
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where [φ1i, φ2i] is the i-th LSE’s “desired SOC range” and mi’s are constants. For suppliers, the
one-step utility function is
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = −
(
aiu
2
i (t) + biui(t) + ci
)
For renewable generation and uncontrollable loads, we set Fi ≡ 0 and let ui(t) be the forecast
value. Data is from ERCOT [58].
To be consistent with the day-ahead market context, let each time interval stand for 1 hour
and let T = 24. We use QCQP (Quadratic Constrained Quadratic Programming) to solve each
agent’s individual optimal control problem (3.4.0.3). We first observe that when hi(t)’s are small,
no branch constraints are binding. This results in LMP’s being identical across all buses. When
we steadily increase hi(t) at bus 3, time t = 4, and hold other hi(t)’s constant for all t, branches
connected to this load (branch no. 2 and 4) become congested, resulting in LMP at bus 3 at time
t = 4 being higher than LMP’s at other buses at t = 4. Similar results are obtained when increasing
hi(t) at bus 19 for t = 6. To better demonstrate the performance of the algorithm, we thus choose
h3(t), h19(t) and h10(t) as in Fig. 3.1 such that there are 4 branches that are congested at least once
in the 24-hour optimization window.
Fig. 3.2 plots the evolution of the price vector (λ, µ) for t = 14, where for simplicity of
notation, from now to the end of the section, we use λi(t) to denote the true LMP λ(t)− µT (t)Hi
for agent i at time t. We see that the LMP for both congested buses and the uncongested bus
converge quickly, in less than 15 iterations.
Fig. 3.3 shows the converged LMPs at different locations. LMPs at buses with relatively high
ambient temperature are higher than those at buses with relatively low temperature, and all LMPs
are positively correlated with ambient temperature (demand).
We compare our multi-period formulation with a single-period formulation. Since current
supply/consumption depends on future prices, iteration at only one time instant is not sufficient
to guarantee optimal solutions when agents have dynamic systems. We thus want to compare
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Figure 3.1: Ambient temperature
total utility obtained by our iterative procedure (on vector of prices) to total utility obtained by
the single-period scheme. To simulate the single-period scheme, we repetitively run algorithm 1
with T = 1 and let initial state at time t + 1 equal to the final state at time t. Fig. 3.4 (additional
temperature data is obtained from [59]) shows that in general, utility obtained by algorithm 1 is
approximately 10% higher than utility obtained by the single-period scheme. We impose a steady
state constraint xi(0) = xi(T ) in order for this optimization problem to be repetitively used. This
results in a sub-optimal, or approximate value of the true maximal utility as T → ∞. We thus
calculate the total utility achieved by setting T = 720 (one month), and compare with utilities
achieved by both Algorithm 1 and the single-period scheme. Results are summarized in Fig. 3.5.
The differences in total utility between the cases having T = 24 and T = 720 are small compared
to the differences between the T = 1 and T = 24 cases. Consequently, Fig. 3.5 demonstrates that
iteration over a finite time horizon, though not optimal, attains higher total social welfare than the
single-period scheme.
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Figure 3.2: Convergence of LMPs at time t = 14
3.6.2 Stochastic case
We adopt the same notations as in the deterministic case, but modify the state equations by
adding a Gaussian random variable ωi incorporating the availability of renewables or stochasticity
of demand. For simplicity we let ωi(t) ∼ N (0, σ2i ). To be consistent with the setting of real-time
market, we let each time interval to be 15-minute and let T = 8.
The inner loop of Algorithm 2 is similar to Algorithm 1 and thus, rapid convergence of the price
vector can be expected. It is shown in [60] that since the implementation of day-ahead market, the
convergence between day-ahead prices and real-time LMPs has been narrowing in PJM market.
Fig. 3.6 shows a similar trend as real-time prices λR(t) track the day-ahead prices λD(t) (with
a time scale of 15-minute, day-ahead hourly prices are step functions) for both congested and
uncongested buses.
In the presence of noise, it can be expected that the variance of prices λ(t) is higher than
the variance of prices in day-ahead market. It is shown in Fig. 3.7 that as variance of noise σ2i
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Figure 3.3: LMPs at different locations
increases, variance of LMPs obtained by Algorithm 2 and LMPs obtained by the single-period
scheme both increase, and variance of congested LMPs increases faster than that of uncongested
LMPs. However, compared to the variance of LMPs obtained by the single-period scheme, vari-
ance of LMPs determined by Algorithm 2 is smaller in both congested and uncongested cases. We
also observe the change in total utility (over 4 hours) while increasing the variance of noise in Fig.
3.8.
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4. INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY IN STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS
4.1 Introduction
Mechanism design is the sub-field of game theory that considers how to implement socially
optimal solutions to problems involving multiple self-interested agents, each with a private util-
ity function. A typical approach in mechanism design is to provide financial incentives such as
payments to promote truth-telling of utility function parameters by agents. An important example
is the Independent System Operator (ISO) problem of electric power systems in which the ISO
aims to maximize social welfare and maintain balance of generation and consumption while each
generator/load has a private utility function.
The classic Vickery-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism [2] has played a central role in classic
mechanism design since it ensures incentive compatibility, i.e., truth-telling of utility functions of
all agents forms a dominant strategy, as well as social welfare optimality, i.e., the sum of utilities of
all agents is maximized. The outcome generated by the VCG mechanism is stronger than a Nash
equilibrium in the sense that it is strategy-proof, meaning that truth-telling of utility functions is
optimal irrespective of what others are bidding. In fact, Green, Laffont and Holmstrom [61] show
that VCG mechanisms are the onlymechanisms that are both efficient and strategy-proof if payoffs
are quasi-linear, i.e., linear in the amount of money.
While the VCGmechanism is applicable to a static one-shot game, it does not work for stochas-
tic dynamic games. In a stochastic dynamic environment that unfolds over time, the agents’ in-
tertemporal payoffs depend on the expected future controls and payments, and a direct extension
of the VCG mechanism does not guarantee incentive compatibility. A fundamental difference be-
tween dynamic and static mechanism design is that in the former, an agent can bid an untruthful
utility function conditional on its past bids (which need not be truthful) and past allocations (from
which it can make an inference about other agents’ utility functions). For dynamic deterministic
systems, by collecting the VCG payments as a lump sum of all the payments over the entire time
49
horizon at the beginning, incentive compatibility is still assured. However, for a dynamic stochas-
tic system, the states are private random variables and it is necessary to incentivize agents to bid
their states truthfully. However, it does not appear to be feasible to construct mechanisms that
ensure the dominance of dynamic truth-telling for agents comprised of general stochastic dynamic
systems.
Nevertheless, for the special case of Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) agents, where agents
have linear state equations, quadratic utility functions and additive white Gaussian noise, we show
that a dynamic stochastic extension of the VCG mechanism does exist, based on a careful con-
struction of a sequence of layered payments over time. We propose a modified layered mechanism
for payments that decouples the intertemporal effect of current bids on future payoffs, and prove
that truth-telling of dynamic states forms a dominant strategy if system parameters are known and
agents are rational. “Rational" means that an agent will adopt a dominant strategy if it is the unique
one, and it will act on the basis that it and others will do so at future times.
An important example of a problem needing such optimal dynamic coordination of stochastic
agents arises in the ISO problem of power systems. Renewable energy resources such as solar/wind
are stochastic and dynamic in nature, as are consumptions by loads which are influenced by factors
such as local temperatures and thermal inertias of facilities. In general, agents may have different
approaches to responding to the prices set by the ISO. If each agent acts as a price taker, i.e.,
it honestly discloses its energy consumption at the announced prices, a competitive equilibrium
would be reached among agents. However, if agents are price anticipators, then it is critical for the
ISO to design a market mechanism that is strategy-proof (i.e., incentive compatible). The challenge
for the ISO is to determine a bidding scheme between agents (producers and consumers) and the
ISO that maximizes social welfare, while taking into account the stochastic dynamic models of
agents. Currently, the ISO solicits bids from generators and Load Serving Entities (LSEs) and
operates two markets: a day-ahead market and a real-time market. The day-ahead market lets
market participants commit to buy or sell wholesale electricity one day before the operating day, to
satisfy energy demand bids and to ensure adequate scheduling of resources to meet the next day’s
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anticipated load. The real-time market lets market participants buy and sell wholesale electricity
during the course of the operating day to balance the differences between day-ahead commitments
and the actual real-time demand and production [31]. Our layered VCG mechanism fits perfectly
in the real-time market, as we will see in the sequel.
However, there is also a fatal downside for the VCG mechanism: in general, the sum of to-
tal payments collected by the ISO may be negative. In fact, when agents have quadratic utility
functions, the total payments collected from consumers is indeed not enough to cover the total
payments to the suppliers. In effect, in order to force agents to reveal their true utility functions,
the ISO needs to subsidize the market. In this chapter we will also propose a solution to this prob-
lem. The VCG payment charges each agent i the difference between social welfare of others if
agent i is absent and social welfare of others when agent i is present. In this chapter we will ex-
hibit a solution for budget balance which consists of inflating the first term above in all the agents’
VCG payments by a constant factor c. We argue that based on historic knowledge of the market,
the ISO may be able to choose such a c that does not depend on any agent’s tactical announcement.
There are several additional issues to be addressed when proposing such a scheme. These concern
the issue of individual rationality, and whether the solution is indeed Lagrange optimal for each
agent. The magnitude of c is important; if the constant number c is chosen to be too large, an agent
may simply opt out of the whole process and not even join the market. That is, the scheme is not
individually rational. Moreover, even if a customer participates, the price and the net utility it ob-
tains, which is the utility of energy consumption minus the amount it pays, need not be Lagrange
optimal. We show that there is indeed a systematic way to choose this number c such that there is
no budget deficit for the ISO, while at the same time guaranteeing that producers and consumers
will actively participate in the market. Moreover, c can be chosen in a way such that the distortion
between the VCG payment and Lagrange payment is minimized in the worst case scenario.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, a survey of related works is
presented. This is followed by a description of the classic VCG framework for the static and
dynamic deterministic problem and the corresponding modified SVCG mechanism in Section 4.3.
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A layered SVCG payment scheme is introduced for the dynamic stochastic problem in Section 4.4.
4.2 Related Works
In recent years, several papers have been written with the aim of exploring issues arising in
dynamic mechanism design. In order to achieve ex post incentive compatibility, Bergemann and
Valimaki [62] propose a generalization of the VCG mechanism based on the marginal contribution
of each agent and show that ex post participation constraints are satisfied under some conditions.
Athey and Segal [63] consider an extension of the d’Aspremont-Gerard-Varet (AGV) mechanism
[64] to design a budget balanced dynamic incentive compatible mechanism. Pavan et al. [65]
derives first-order conditions under which incentive compatibility is guaranteed by generalizing
Mirrlees’s [66] envelope formula of static mechanisms. Cavallo et al. [67] considers a dynamic
Markovian model and derives a sequence of Groves-like payments which achieves Markov perfect
equilibrium. Bapna and Weber [68] solves a sequential allocation problem by formulating it as a
multi-armed bandit problem. Parkes and Singh [69] and Friedman and Parkes [70] consider an en-
vironment with randomly arriving and departing agents and propose a “delayed” VCG mechanism
to guarantee interim incentive compatibility. Besanko et al. [71] and Battaglini et al. [72] char-
acterize the optimal infinite-horizon mechanism for an agent modeled as a Markov process, with
Besanko considering a linear AR(1) process over a continuum of states, and Battaglini focusing on
a two-state Markov chain. Bergemann and Pavan [73] have an excellent survey on recent research
in dynamic mechanism design. A more recent survey paper by Bergemann and Valimaki [74] fur-
ther discusses the dynamic mechanism design problem with risk-averse agents and the relationship
between dynamic mechanism and optimal contracts.
In order to capture strategic interactions between the ISO and market participants, game theory
and mechanism design has been proposed in many recent papers. Sessa et al. [75] studies the VCG
mechanism for electricity markets and derives conditions to ensure collusion and shill bidding are
not profitable. Okajima et al. [76] propose a VCG-based mechanism that guarantees incentive
compatibility and individual rationality for day-ahead market with equality and inequality con-
straints. Xu et al. [77] shows that the VCG mechanism always results in higher per-unit electricity
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prices than the locational marginal price (LMP) mechanism under any given set of reported supply
curves, and that the difference between the per-unit prices resulting from the two mechanisms is
negligibly small. Bistarelli et al. [78] derives a VCG-based mechanism to drive users in shifting
energy consumption during peak hours. In Samadi et al. [79], it is proposed that utility compa-
nies use VCG mechanism to collect private information of electricity users to optimize the energy
consumption schedule.
There are also some related works aiming at achieving budget balance for VCG mechanism.
Moulin et al. [80] discusses the trade-off between budget balance and efficiency of the mechanism.
Cavallo [81] uses domain information regarding agent valuation spaces to achieve redistribution of
much of the required transfer payments back among the agents. Similarly, Thirumulanathan et al.
[82] propose a mechanism that is efficient and comes close to budget balance by returning much of
the payments back to the agents in the form of rebates. In [83], an enhanced (Arrow-dAspremont-
Gerard-Varet) AGV mechanism is proposed to tackle the problem of budget balance in demand
side management.
To our knowledge, there does not appear to be any result that ensures dominance of dynamic
truth-telling for agents comprised of LQG systems, let alone ensuring budget balance of the ISO
and individual rationality for all agents.
4.3 The Static and Dynamic Deterministic VCG
Let us begin by considering the simpler static deterministic case. Suppose there are N agents,
with each agent having a utility functionFi(ui), where ui is the amount of energy produced/consumed
by agent i. We will use the convention that ui ≤ 0 for a producer and ui ≥ 0 for a consumer. Fi(ui)
depends only on its own consumption/generation ui. However, for convenience of notation, we will
occasionally abuse notation and write Fi(u) with the implicit understanding that it only depends
on the i-th component ui of u.
Let u := (u1, ..., uN)T , u−i := (u1, ..., ui−1, ui+1, ..., uN)T , and let F := (F1, . . . , Fn).
In a power system the total energy generated must equal to the total consumed, i.e.,
∑
i ui = 0.
An independent system operator which does not know the utility functions of the agents, wishes
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to maximize the social welfare. The social welfare is defined as
∑
i Fi(ui). Hence it seeks to
solve the following optimization problem and assign the resulting generations/consumptions to the
agents: maxu1,u2,...,uN Fi(ui), subject to
∑
i ui = 0.
However, as noted above the ISO does not know the individual utility functions of the agents.
If it asks them to disclose their utility functions they may lie in order to obtain a better allocation.
A solution to this problem of “truth-telling" is provided by the VCG mechanism. In the VCG
mechanism, each agent is asked to bid its utility function. Let us denote its bid by Fˆi. The agent
can lie, so Fˆi may not be equal to Fi. We denote Fˆ := (Fˆ1, . . . Fˆn). After obtaining the bids, the
ISO calculates u∗(Fˆ ) as the optimal solution to the following problem:
max
u
∑
i
Fˆi(ui)
subject to
∑
i
ui = 0.
Each agent is then assigned to produce/consume u∗i (Fˆ ), and is obliged to do so, accruing a utility
Fi
(
u∗i
(
Fˆ
))
. Following the rule that it has announced a priori before receiving the bids, the ISO
collects a payment pi(Fˆ ) from agent i, defined as follows:
pi(Fˆ ) :=
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u
(i))−
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u
∗(Fˆ )),
where u(i) is defined as the optimal solution to the following problem:
max
u−i
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(uj)
subject to ∑
j ̸=i
uj = 0.
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We can see that pi is the cost to the rest of the agents due to agent i’s presence, which leads agents
to internalize the social externality.
In fact, the VCG mechanism is a special case of the Groves mechanism [84], where payment
pi is defined as:
pi(Fˆ ) = hi(Fˆ−i)−
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u
∗(Fˆ )).
where hi is any arbitrary function of Fˆ−i := (Fˆ1, .., Fˆi−1, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN). Truth-telling is a dominant
strategy in the Groves mechanism [84]. That is, regardless of other agents’ strategies, an agent
cannot do better than truthfully declaring its utility function.
Theorem 3. [84] Truth-telling (Fˆi ≡ Fi) is the dominant strategy equilibrium in Groves mecha-
nism.
Proof. Suppose agent i announces the true utility function Fi. Let F¯ := (Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1, Fi, Fˆi+1,
..., FˆN) and F¯−i := (Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN). Let F¯ (u) :=
∑
i F¯i(ui). Let u¯
∗
i be what ISO
assigns, and pi(F¯ ) be what ISO charges, when F¯ is announced by the agents. Let u∗i be what ISO
assigns and pi(Fˆ ) be what ISO charges when Fˆ is announced by agents.
Note that F¯−i = Fˆ−i, and so hi(F¯−i) = hi(Fˆ−i). Hence for agent i, the difference between the
net utilities resulting from announcing Fi and Fˆi is
[
Fi(u¯
∗
i )− pi(F¯ )
]
−
[
Fi(u
∗
i )− pi(Fˆ )
]
=Fi(u¯
∗
i )− hi(F¯−i) +
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u¯
∗
i )− Fi(u∗i ) + hi(Fˆ−i)
−
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u
∗
i ) = F¯ (u¯
∗)− F¯ (u∗) ≥ 0,
where the last inequality holds since u¯∗ is the optimal solution to the social welfare problem with
utility functions F¯ .
Definition 1. We call a mechanism incentive compatible (IC) if truth-telling is a dominant strategy
for agents.
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One should note that an agent may not necessarily tell the truth even if truth-telling is dominant
since there may be another strategy that is also dominant. However, we assume that the agent is
“rational," in that if the dominant strategy is unique, then the agent will indeed tell the truth.
Definition 2. We call a mechanism efficient (EF) if the resulting allocation u∗ maximizes the
social welfare
∑
i Fi(ui).
It is seen that the VCG mechanism is IC, and if all agents declare their utility functions truth-
fully, then the VCG mechanism is also EF.
In addition to choosing a strategy that maximizes social welfare, there are two more important
properties that are sought in a solution.
Definition 3. A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if agents actively participate in the mech-
anism, which they will do if they can gain a nonnegative net utility by participating, that is,
Fi(u
∗
i )− pi ≥ 0.
Definition 4. A mechanism satisfies budget balance (BB) if the total payment made by agents
is nonnegative:
∑
i pi ≥ 0. (In our context this means that the ISO does not have to provide a
subsidy).
The VCG mechanism, in general, does not satisfy BB. In fact, more generally, Green and
Laffont [61] show that no mechanism can satisfy all the four properties (IC, EF, IR & BB) at the
same time.
If ISO knew the true utility functions of all the agents, it could solve the social welfare problem
in a centralized manner: calculate the Lagrange multiplier λ∗ (price), and collect a payment that
equals to λ∗u∗i from agent i. We call this payment naturally defined by the Lagrange multiplier, in
the absence of strategic considerations, as the Lagrange payment and have the following definition:
Definition 5. If the optimal solution (λ∗, u∗) is unique, we call a mechanism Lagrange Optimal if
the payment pi collected from agent i is equal to the Lagrange payment λ∗u∗i .
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We need to somehow overcome the difficulty recognized by Green and Laffont [61] noted
above. We will show in the sequel that while there is no mechanism that satisfies all four properties
(IC, EF, IR and BB) in general, there does exist such a mechanism under a “market power balance"
condition.
In order to satisfy IC, EF, IR and BB at the same time, we inflate the first term in the standard
VCG mechanism by a constant factor c:
pi(Fˆ ) = c ·
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u
(i))−
∑
j ̸=i
Fˆj(u
∗). (4.3.0.1)
We call the VCG mechanism with the above payment structure as a Scaled VCG (SVCG) mech-
anism, and c as the scaling factor. To achieve BB and IR, one could choose c as a function of the
utility bids Fˆi, which unfortunately would cease to guarantee incentive compatibility since the first
term in (4.3.0.1) is not allowed to be dependent on Fˆi in the Groves mechanism.
We will show below that there is a range of values of c that can ensure BB, and argue that
through its long-term operation, the ISO may be able to learn at least a subset of this range of
values of c which ensure that all four properties hold. Our presumptive argument rests on the
repetitive nature of this problem which is played out every day, allowing the ISO to be able to tune
c to avoid a net subsidy. Based on this experience, the ISO could choose a c for which BB and
IR hold at the same time. We show in the following theorem that under a certain market power
balance condition, it is possible to find such a range of values for c.
As we have shown above, truth-telling is a dominant strategy under the Groves mechanism. In
this dominant strategy equilibrium, every agent i will announce its true utility function Fi if that is
the unique dominant solution.
Theorem 4. Let u∗ be the optimal solution to the following problem:
max
∑
i
Fi(ui), subject to
∑
i
ui = 0,
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and suppose that u∗ is unique. We will also suppose that u(i) is the unique optimal solution to the
following problem:
max
∑
j ̸=i
Fj(uj), subject to
∑
j ̸=i
uj = 0.
Let Hi :=
∑
j ̸=i Fj(u
(i)), and let Hmax = maxiHi. Let F ∗ =
∑
j Fj(u
∗). If F ∗ > 0, Hi > 0
for all i, and the following Market Power Balance (MPB) condition holds:
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, (4.3.0.2)
then there exists an interval [c, c¯] such that for any c chosen in this interval, the SVCG mechanism
satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR at the same time.
Proof. With c chosen as a constant, the SVCG mechanism is within the Groves class and thus
satisfies IC and EF. To achieve budget balance, we need
∑
i
pi = c
∑
i
Hi − (N − 1)F ∗ ≥ 0,
or equivalently, we need to have,
c ≥ (N − 1)F
∗∑
iHi
.
To achieve individual rationality for agent i, we also need
Fi(u
∗)− pi = Fi(u∗)− c ·Hi +
∑
j ̸=i
Fi(u
∗) ≥ 0,
or equivalently, we need to have,
c ≤ F
∗
Hi
.
Combining both the inequalities, we need to be able to choose a c such that
(N − 1)F ∗∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ F
∗
Hmax
. (4.3.0.3)
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Let c := (N−1)F
∗∑
iHi
, and c¯ := F
∗
Hmax
. Such a c exists if
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, F
∗ > 0, Hi > 0 for all i.
The critical condition in the above theorem is (4.3.0.2), which states that no agent that has
significantly bigger or smaller market power than others. Individual residential load customers
generally have a much smaller scale compared to power plant, and it is thus beneficial to form
load aggregators or utility companies at the consumer side as suggested by the SVCG mechanism.
This provides an economic justification for the role of load aggregators or load serving entities that
guarantee the achievement of social welfare maximization.
In general, a SVCG mechanism is however not Lagrange optimal. Within the feasible range
[c, c¯], one may like to choose a c that also achieves near Lagrange optimality. This could be
formulated as the following MinMax problem:
min
c
max
i
|di(c)|, subject to (4.3.0.3),
where di(c) := λ∗u∗i−pi = λ∗u∗i−c·Hi+
∑
j ̸=i Fj(u
∗). The MinMax problem can be transformed
to a linear program:
min Z
subject to
Z ≥ di(c), for all i,
Z ≥ −di(c), for all i,
(N − 1)F ∗∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ F
∗
Hmax
.
In the absence of knowledge of the utility functions, perhaps the market experience could guide
the ISO over time to an appropriate choice. Shortly, we will revisit this problem from a different,
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asymptotic, point of view. We illustrate the MinMax problem with a numerical example below.
Example 1. All agents have quadratic utility functions: Fi = riu2i + siui. (r1, r2, r3, r4) =
(−1,−1.1,−1.2,−1.1) and (s1, s2, s3, s4) = (1, 1.2, 4, 5). The unique Lagrange optimal solu-
tion is u∗ = (−0.86,−0.70, 0.53, 1.03), λ∗ = 2.73, and from (4.3.0.3), 1.13 ≤ c ≤ 1.19. The
optimal solution to the MinMax problem is (c∗, Z∗) = (1.14, 0.22). Thus, by choosing c = 1.14,
the SVCG mechanism satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR, and the maximum discrepancy between VCG
payment and Lagrange payments is 0.22.
In the MinMax problem, one can also replace di(c) by the ratio di(c)/λ∗u∗i to normalize the
nearness to Lagrange payment by the amount of the payment. It also can be written as an LP. Using
the above ratio, the optimal solution is (c∗, Z∗) = (1.18, 0.06), showing that all agents pay/receive
within 6% of their Lagrange optimal payment.
Now we consider N heterogeneous agents and show that SVCG payments converge to the
Lagrange payment as N increases. Let Fi(ui) = aiu2i + biui be the quadratic utility functions for
both suppliers and consumers. Denote by A = diag(a1, a2, ..., aN) the diagonal matrix consisting
of all the ai, B := [b1; ...; bN ] and U = [u1; ...;uN ]. We suppose A < 0. The ISO needs to solve
the following problem:
max UTAU +BTU (4.3.0.4)
subject to
1TU = 0. (4.3.0.5)
where 1 is the all-one vector of proper size. The solution to this problem is:
λ∗N = γ1TA−1B, (4.3.0.6)
U∗N =
1
2
A−1
(
λ∗N · 1−B) . (4.3.0.7)
where γ = (trace (A−1))−1 = 1TA−11 and index N is used to keep track of the population size.
Note also that the optimal social welfare is 1
4
λ21TA−11 = 1
4
(1TA−1B)2
1TA−11 .
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Theorem 5. For the SVCG mechanism with quadratic utility functions, if (ai, bi) satisfy the fol-
lowing:
1. a ≤ ai ≤ a¯ < 0, 0 < b ≤ bi ≤ b¯,
2. (N − 1)Hmax(N) ≤
∑
iHi(N), F
∗(N) > 0, Hi(N) > 0, where the argument N denotes
that the corresponding quantity refers to the system with agents 1, 2, ...N ,
then the following holds:
1. There exists a cN satisfying:
(N − 1)F ∗(N)∑
iHi(N)
≤ c ≤ F
∗(N)
Hmax(N)
.
Moreover, any such cN satisfies limN→∞ cN = 1,
2. limN→∞(λ∗Nu∗Ni − pNi ) = 0, for all i.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we provide the proof for the first agent. LetA−1 = diag(a2, ..., aN),
B−1 = [b2; ...; bN ], 1−1 be the all-one vector of dimensionM+N−1 and γ−1 =
(
trace
(
A−1−1
))−1.
We first prove the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. Let U∗ andW ∗ be the optimal solutions to the problem consisting of all agents and the
problem excluding the first agent, respectively. Then, as the number of agents increases,
lim
N→∞
[
0(N−1)×1 IN−1
]
U∗ −W ∗ = O(1/N), (4.3.0.8)
where 0(N−1)×1 is the N − 1 dimensional column vector of zeroes, and IN−1 is the N − 1 dimen-
sional identity matrix.
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Proof. According to equations (4.3.0.6) and (4.3.0.7),
[
0 I
]
U∗ −W ∗ =
=
1
2
[
0 I
]a−11 0
0 A−1−1

γ · [1 1T−1]
a−11 0
0 A−1−1

 b1
B−1

 1
1−1
−
 b1
B−1

− 1
2
A−1−1
(
γ−11T−1A
−1
−1B−11−1 −B−1
)
=
1
2
(
γa−11 b1 + (γ − γ−1) 1T−1A−1−1B−1
)
A−1−11−1.
Since a ≤ ai ≤ a¯ < 0, γ = Θ(1/N), and γ < 0, a¯baN ≤ γa−11 b1 ≤ ab¯a¯N , a¯
2
−aN(N−1) ≤ γ − γ−1 ≤
a2
−a¯N(N−1) ,
a2b¯
−a¯2N ≤ (γ − γ−1)1T−1A−1−1B−1 ≤ a¯
2b
−a2N . Therefore,
lim
N→∞
[
0 I
]
U∗ −W ∗ = 0.
Let
[
0 I
]
U∗ = V ∗. From Lemma 1, we know that v∗i − w∗i = O( 1N ) where vi and wi is the
i-th component of V ∗ andW ∗, respectively. Hence,
F ∗
H1
=
a1u
∗2
1 + b1u
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2(aiv
∗2
i + biv
∗
i )∑N
i=2(aiw
∗2
i + biw
∗
i )
=
a1u
∗2
1 + b1u
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2 (aiw
∗2
i + biw
∗
i +G1)∑N
i=2(aiw
∗2
i + biw
∗
i )
,
where G1 = (2aiw∗i + bi)O(
1
N
) + aiO(
1
N2
). From equations (4.3.0.6) and (4.3.0.7), we know that
w∗i = Θ(1). Therefore,
lim
N→∞
F ∗
H1
= 1.
Similarly, for all other i,
lim
N→∞
F ∗
Hi
= 1.
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Therefore,
lim
N→∞
c¯N = 1.
Let Hmin = miniHi. Since
(N−1)F ∗
NHmax
≤ cN ≤ (N−1)F ∗
NHmin
,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
Consequently,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
From Lemma 1, we haveW ∗−V ∗ = −1
2
(
γa−11 b1 + (γ − γ−1) ξ
)
A−1−11−1, where ξ = 1
T
−1A
−1
−1B−1
and ξ = Θ(N). The payment by Agent 1 is:
pN1 = U
∗T
−1A−1U
∗
−1 +B
T
−1U
∗
−1 − V ∗TA−1V ∗ −BT−1V ∗
= (U∗−1 + V
∗)TA−1(U∗−1 − V ∗) +BT−1(U∗−1 − V ∗).
The difference between Lagrange payment and VCG payment is:
λ∗Nu∗N1 − pN1
=
1
2a1
γ(a−11 b1 + ξ)
(
γ
(
a−11 b1 + ξ
)− b1)− pN1
=
1
2a1
γ2(a−11 b1 + ξ)
2 − b1
2a1
γ(a−11 b1 + ξ)
−
[
1
2
[(
γa−11 b1 + (γ + γ−1) ξ
)
1T−1 − 2BT−1
]
A−1−1A−1 +B
T
−1
]
· −1
2
(
γa−11 b−1 + (γ − γ−1) ξ
)
A−1−11−1
=
1
2a1
γ2(a−11 b1 + ξ)
2 − b1
2a1
γ(a−11 b1 + ξ)
+
1
4γ−1
[
γ2a−21 b
2
1 + 2a
−1
1 b1γ
2ξ + (γ2 − γ−2−1)ξ2
]
.
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Since γ = Θ( 1
N
),
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗Nu∗N1 − pN1
)
= lim
N→∞
[
γ2ξ2
2a1
− b1γξ
2a1
+
b1γ
2ξ
2a1γ−1
+
(γ2 − γ2−1)ξ2
4γ−1
]
= lim
N→∞
[
ξ2
4
(
2γ2
a1
+
γ2 − γ2−1
γ−1
)− b1γξ
2a1
(1− γ
γ−1
)
]
= lim
N→∞
[
ξ2
4
(
γ2
a1
+ γ − γ−1)
]
.
By calculation, we have
γ2
a1
+ γ − γ−1 = −1
a21
[
1
(
∑N
i=1
1
ai
)2(
∑N
j=2
1
aj
)
]
= O(
1
N3
).
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗Nu∗N1 − pN1
)
= 0.
The above VCG scheme can be extended to the important case of deterministic dynamic sys-
tems. One can consider the entire sequence of actions taken by an agent as a vector action. That
is, one can view the problem as an open-loop control problem, where the entire decision on the
sequence of controls to be employed is taken at the initial time, and so treatable as a static problem.
For agent i, let Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) be the one-step utility function at time t. Suppose that the state
of agent i evolves as:
xi(t+ 1) = gi(xi(t), ui(t)).
The ISO asks each agent i to bid its one-step utility functions, state equations and initial condition.
Denote the one-step utility function bids made by agent i by {Fˆi(xi(t), ui(t)), t = 0, 1, . . . , T −1},
its state equation bids by {gˆi, t = 0, 1, . . . , T − 1}, and its initial condition bid by xˆi,0. The ISO
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then calculates (x∗i (t), u
∗
i (t)) as the optimal solution, assumed to be unique, to the following utility
maximization problem:
max
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆi(xi(t), ui(t))
subject to
xi(t+ 1) = gˆi(xi(t), ui(t)), for ∀i and ∀t,
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for ∀t,
xi(0) = xˆi,0, for ∀i.
We denote this problem as (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0). We can extend the notion of VCG payment pi to the deter-
ministic dynamic system as follow. Let
pi :=
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
(i)
j (t), u
(i)
j (t))−
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j(t), u
∗
j(t)).
Here (x(i)i (t), u
(i)
i (t)) is the optimal solution to the following problem, which is assumed to be
unique:
max
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(xj(t), uj(t))
subject to
xj(t+ 1) = gˆj(xj(t), uj(t)), for j ̸= i and ∀t,∑
j ̸=i
uj(t) = 0, for ∀t,
xj(0) = xˆj,0, for j ̸= i.
More generally, we can consider a Groves payment pi defined as:
pi := hi,t(Fˆ−i)−
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=0
Fˆj(x
∗
j(t), u
∗
j(t)),
65
where hi,t is any arbitrary function. We first show in the following theorem that truth-telling is still
the dominant strategy equilibrium in Groves mechanism.
Theorem 6. Truth-telling of utility function, state dynamics and initial condition (Fˆi ≡ Fi, gˆi ≡ gi
and xˆi,0 = xi,0) is a dominant strategy equilibrium under the Groves mechanism for a dynamic
system.
Proof. Let Fˆ := (Fˆ1, ..., Fˆi, ..., FˆN), gˆ := (gˆ1..., gˆi, ..., gˆN), and xˆ0 := (xˆ1,0, ..., xˆi,0, ..., xˆN,0). Sup-
pose agent i announces the true one-step utility function Fi, true state dynamics gi, and true initial
condition xi,0. Let F¯ := (Fˆ1, ...Fˆi−1, Fi, Fˆi+1, ..., FˆN), g¯ := (gˆ1, ...gˆi−1, gi, gˆi+1, ..., gˆN), and x¯0 :=
(xˆ1,0, ...xˆi−1,0, xi,0, xˆi+1,0, ..., xˆN,0). Let (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t)) be what ISO assigns and pi(F¯ , g¯, x¯0) be what
ISO charges when (F¯ , g¯, x¯0) is announced by agents. Let (x∗i (t), u
∗
i (t)) be what ISO assigns and
pi(Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0) be what ISO charges when (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0) is announced by agents. Let F¯ (xi(t), ui(t)) :=∑
i F¯i(xi(t), ui(t)).
For agent i, the difference between net utility resulting from announcing (Fi, gi, xi,0) and
(Fˆi, gˆi, xˆi,0) is
[∑
t
Fi(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))− pi(F¯ , g¯, x¯0)
]
−
[∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t))− pi(Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0)
]
=
∑
t
Fi(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))− hi,t(F¯−i) +
∑
j ̸=i
∑
t
Fˆj(x¯
∗
i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))
−
∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t)) + hi,t(Fˆ−i)−
∑
j ̸=i
∑
t
Fˆj(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t))
=
∑
t
F¯ (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t))−
∑
t
F¯ (x∗i (t), u
∗
i (t)) ≥ 0,
since (x¯∗i (t), u¯
∗
i (t)) is the optimal solution to the problem (F¯ , g¯, x¯0).
As in the static case, we show below that there exists a range of values c under which the scaled
VCG payment achieves IC, EF, BB and IR at the same time. As in the static case, we suppose that
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from experience, the ISO can choose a value of c in this range, which does not depend on the
agents’ bids, to achieve BB and IR.
Truth-telling is a dominant strategy under the Groves mechanism. Under the dominant strategy
equilibrium, every agent i will announce its true utility function Fi, state dynamics gi and initial
condition xi,0.
Theorem 7. Let u∗(t) be the optimal solution to the following problem:
max
∑
i
∑
t
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)),
subject to
xi(t+ 1) = gi(xi(t), ui(t)), for all i∑
i
ui(t) = 0, for all t and xi(0) = xi,0.
and let u(i)(t) be the optimal solution to the following problem:
max
∑
j ̸=i
∑
t
Fj(xj(t), uj(t)),
subject to
xj(t+ 1) = gj(xj(t), uj(t)), for j ̸= i,∑
j ̸=i
uj(t) = 0, for all t and xj(0) = xj,0 for j ̸= i.
Let Hi :=
∑
j ̸=i
∑
t Fj(x
(i)
j (t), u
(i)
j (t)), and let Hmax = maxiHi. Let F
∗ :=
∑
t
∑
j Fj(x
∗
j(t),
u∗j(t)). If F
∗ > 0,Hi > 0 for all i, and MPB (4.3.0.2) condition holds, then there exists an c and c¯,
with c ≤ c¯ such that if the constant c is chosen in the range [c, c¯], then the Scaled VCG mechanism
for the deterministic dynamic system satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR at the same time.
Proof. Because c is not a function of (Fˆ , gˆ, xˆ0), SVCG is within the Groves class and thus IC and
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EF. To achieve budget balance, we need,
∑
i
pi = c
∑
i
Hi − (N − 1)
∑
t
∑
j
Fj(x
∗
j(t), u
∗
j(t)) ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
c ≥ (N − 1)F
∗∑
iHi
.
To achieve individual rationality for agent i, we need
∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t))− pi =
∑
t
Fi(x
∗
i (t), u
∗
i (t))− c ·Hi
+
∑
j ̸=i
∑
t
Fj(x
∗
j(t), u
∗
j(t)) ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
c ≤ F
∗
Hi
.
Combining all the inequalities,
(N − 1)F ∗∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ F
∗
Hmax
. (4.3.0.9)
Let c := (N−1)F
∗∑
iHi
, and c¯ := F
∗
Hmax
. To ensure c ≤ c¯, one sufficient condition is,
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, F
∗ > 0, Hi > 0 for all i,
Similar to the static case, we may want to choose a c that achieves almost Lagrange optimality.
This can be formulated as the following MinMax problem:
min
c
max
i
|di(c)|, subject to (4.3.0.9).
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where di(c) :=
∑
t λ
∗(t)u∗i (t) − pi =
∑
t λ
∗(t)u∗i (t) − c · Hi +
∑
j ̸=i
∑
t Fj(x
∗
j(t), u
∗
j(t)). The
MinMax problem can in turn be transformed to a linear program:
min Z
subject to
Z ≥ di(c), for all i,
Z ≥ −di(c), for all i,
(N − 1)F ∗∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ F
∗
H
.
One can also replace di(c) by the fractional deviation di(c)/
∑
t λ
∗(t)u∗i (t).
As in the static case, the SVCG mechanism is asymptotically Lagrange optimal as the number
of agents goes to infinity. Without loss of generality, we consider the special case where agents
have quadratic utility functions and linear state dynamics: Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = qix2i (t) + riu
2
i (t) and
xi(t+ 1) = aixi(t) + biui(t). We suppose qi ≤ 0, and ri < 0.
Theorem 8. For SVCG mechanism with quadratic utility functions and linear state dynamics, if
(ai, bi, pi, qi) satisfies the following:
1. a ≤ |ai|≤ a¯, b ≤ |bi|≤ b¯, q ≤ qi ≤ q¯ < 0 and r ≤ ri ≤ r¯ < 0,
2. (N − 1)Hmax(N) ≤
∑
iHi(N), F
∗(N) > 0 and Hi(N) > 0 for all i.
then the following hold:
1. There exist cN ≤ c¯N such that for any cN ∈ [cN , c¯N ], BB and IR hold. Moreover, limN→∞ cN =
1,
2. limN→∞
(∑
t
(
λ∗N(t)uNi (t)
)− pNi ) = 0, for all i.
Proof. Let X(t) = (x1(t), x2(t), ..., xN(t))T , U(t) = (u1(t), u2(t), ..., uN(t))T , A = diag(a1, a2,
..., aN), B = diag(b1, b2, ..., bN), Q = diag(q1, q2, ..., qN), and R = diag(r1, r2, ..., rN). The
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utility maximization problem can be rewritten as the following Linear-Quadratic (LQ) problem:
max
T−1∑
t=0
XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t) (4.3.0.10)
subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BU(t), (4.3.0.11)
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t.
By substituting (4.3.0.11) into (4.3.0.10), and using the fact that open-loop optimal control is
equivalent to the closed-loop optimal solution to LQ problem, we have the following equivalent
augmented LQ problem:
max ΩT (t)WΩ(t) + V TΩ(t) (4.3.0.12)
subject to
Y TΩ(t) = 0. (4.3.0.13)
where Ω := (U1;U2; ...;UN), and Ui = (ui(0);ui(1); ...;ui(T − 1)), W and V are formed by
multiplication and addition of A,B,Q,R and Y := [IT ; IT ; ...; IT ] with N T -dimensional identity
matrix IT . More specifically,W can be partitioned into diagonal blocks: W = diag(W1, ...,WN),
where each blockWi is a T × T square matrix consisting of multiplication and addition of ai, bi,
qi, ri.
Noting that the optimization problem (4.3.0.12) and (4.3.0.13) is in the same form as (4.3.0.4)
and (4.3.0.5), the unique Lagrange multiplier λ is calculated as:
λ∗ = ΓY TW−1V,
where Γ = (Y TW−1Y )−1. The key to the proof of Theorem 5 is to show that γ is Θ(1/N). (Note
that f(N) = Ω(g(N)) if f(N) = O(g(N)) as well as g(N) = Ω(f(N))). Similarly, by expanding
Γ = (W−11 +W
−1
2 +...+W
−1
N )
−1 and applying bounded inverse theorem [85], ||Γ|| is alsoΘ(1/N)
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since ai, bi, qi, ri are all uniformly bounded, respectively.
Let Ω∗ be the optimal solution to problem (4.3.0.12) and (4.3.0.13) consisting of all agents and
let Ψ∗ be the optimal solution to the problem excluding the first agent. By replacing A, B and 1
withW , V and Y respectively, we have
lim
N→∞
[
0(N−1)T×T I(N−1)T
]
Ω∗ −Ψ∗ = 0.
Let
[
0 I
]
Ω∗ = Φ∗. From above, we know that Φ∗i − Ψ∗i = O( 1N )1 where Φi and Ψi is the i-th
T -length component of Φ∗ and Ψ∗, respectively. Hence,
F ∗
H1
=
U∗T1 W1U
∗
1 + V
T
1 U
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2(Φ
∗T
i WiΦ
∗
i + V
T
i Φ
∗
i )∑N
i=2(Ψ
∗T
i WiΨ
∗
i + V
T
i Ψ
∗
i )
=
U∗T1 W1U
∗
1 + V
T
1 U
∗
1 +
∑N
i=2(Ψ
∗T
i WiΨ
∗
i + V
T
i Ψ
∗
i +G1)∑N
i=2(Ψ
∗T
i WiΨ
∗
i + V
T
i Ψ
∗
i )
where G1 = (2Ψ∗Ti Wi1 + V
T
i 1)O(
1
N
) + 1TWi1 ·O( 1N2 ). Since Ψ∗i = Θ(1)1, we have
lim
N→∞
F ∗N
HN1
= 1.
Similarly, for all other i,
lim
N→∞
F ∗N
HNi
= 1.
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
c¯N = 1.
Let Hmin = miniHi. Since
(N−1)F ∗
NHmax
≤ cN ≤ (N−1)F ∗
NHmin
,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
Consequently,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
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From Lemma 1, we have,
Ψ∗ − Φ∗ = −1
2
W−1−1 Y−1(ΓW
−1
−1 V−1 + (Γ− Γ−1)Ξ),
where W−1, V−1 are formed by removing W1 and V1 from W and V , respectively. Y−1 =
[IT ; ...; IT ] with (N − 1) T -dimensional identity matrix. Ξ = Y −1−1 W−1−1 V−1 and Ξ = O(N)1.
Similarly as in Theorem 5, we have,
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗TU∗1 − pN1
)
= lim
N→∞
[
1
2
(V T1 W
−1
1 + Ξ
T )ΓT [W−11 Γ(W
−1
1 V1 + Ξ)−W−11 V1]
−
[
1
2
[(
ΓW−1−1 V−1 + (Γ + Γ−1)Ξ
)T
Y T−1 − 2V−1
]T
W−1−1W−1 + V
T
−1
]
· −1
2
W−1−1 Y−1(ΓW
−1
−1 V−1 + (Γ− Γ−1)Ξ)
]
= lim
N→∞
(
1
4
ΞT
(
ΓTW−11 Γ + Γ− Γ−1
)
Ξ
)
It is straightforward to see that,
ΓTW−11 Γ + Γ− Γ−1
=−
(
N∑
i=1
W−1i
)−1
W−11
(
N∑
i=1
W−1i
)−1
W−11
(
N∑
i=2
W−1i
)−1
=O(
1
N3
).
Consequently,
lim
N→∞
(
λ∗TU∗i − pNi
)
= 0.
72
4.4 The Dynamic Stochastic VCG
In the previous section, we have shown that the VCG mechanism can be naturally extended to
deterministic dynamic systems by employing an open-loop solution. However, when agents are
stochastic dynamic systems, we need to consider closed-loop control laws for each agent. Such
closed-loop control laws depend on the observations of the agents, which are generally private.
So the states of the system are private random variables. Hence the problem becomes one of ad-
ditionally ensuring that each agent reveals its “true" state at all times. However, since an agent’s
intertemporal payoff depends on the expected future payments and allocations in a dynamic game,
the agent’s current bid needs not maximize its current payoff. What’s more, since dishonest bids
distort current and future allocations in different ways, an agent’s optimal bid will depend on oth-
ers’ bids. This additional complication precludes a dominant strategy solution for general stochas-
tic dynamic systems. All that one can possibly hope for is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
where each agent can assume other agents’s strategies. Thus it appears one cannot hope to have an
incentive compatible and social welfare optimal solution for general stochastic dynamic systems.
However, as we will see, in the case of LQG agents one can indeed ensure the dominance of truth
telling strategies that reveal the true states.
For agent i, let wi(t) be the discrete-time noise process affecting state xi(t) via:
xi(t+ 1) = gi(xi(t), ui(t), wi(t)),
where xi(0) is independent of wi. The uncertainties of all the agents are independent.
The ISO aims to maximize the social welfare:
max E
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
t=0
Fi(xi(t), ui(t))
subject to
N∑
i=1
ui(t) = 0, for ∀t, (4.4.0.1)
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We first assume that Fi, gi and the distributions of the uncertainties are known to the ISO,
and that agents bid their states xi(t) as xˆi(t). A straightforward extension of the static Groves
mechanism would be to collect a payment pi(t) at time t from agent i defined as:
pi(t)
=hi(Xˆ−i(t))− E
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
τ=t
[
Fj(xˆj(τ), u
∗
j(τ)) | X(t) = Xˆ(t)
]
where xˆi(t) is what agent i bids for his state at time t, Xˆ−i(t) = [xˆ1(t), ..., xˆi−1(t), xˆi+1(t),
..., xˆN(t)]
T and u∗j(t) is the optimal solution to the following problem:
max E
N∑
i=1
T−1∑
τ=t
[
Fj(xˆj(τ), u
∗
j(τ)) | X(t) = Xˆ(t)
]
subject to
xi(τ + 1) = gi(xi(τ), ui(τ), wi(τ)),
N∑
i=1
ui(τ) = 0, for t ≤ τ ≤ T − 1, (4.4.0.2)
Xˆ(τ) = [xˆ1(τ), ..., xˆN(τ)]
T .
It is easy to verify that truth-telling of states by all agents forms a subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium since truth-telling of xi(t) for agent i is a best response given that all other agents bid
truthfully for all τ ≥ t. In fact it yields the minimum net cost (payment + one step cost) at time
t. In that sense it is “myopically" optimal. However, truth-telling of states does not constitute
a dominant strategy because another agent j may bid xˆj(t + 1) at time t + 1 truthfully, but lies
about the state xj(t) at time t in order to obtain a preferable state at the next time t + 1. More
specifically, if we assume all agents will bid truthfully from t + 1 onward, then at time t, if agent
j bids some untruthful xˆj(t), truth-telling of state for agent i will be an optimal strategy only if
agent j continues to bid “an untruthful but consistent” xˆj(t) which stems from his untruthful bid
xˆj(t). By “consistent" we mean the state that would result from the untruthful xˆj(t) but with the
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truthful state noise wj(t). In other word, agent i’s will bid truthfully only if agent j “consistently”
lies about his state, which is not guaranteed using the above payment scheme.
We now show that while an incentive compatible strategy presents fundamental challenges for
general stochastic dynamic systems, there is a solution for LQG systems. We need to investigate
the structure of LQG system more carefully.
For agent i, let wi(t) ∼ N (0, σi) be the discrete-time additive Gaussian white noise process
affecting state xi(t) via:
xi(t+ 1) = aixi(t) + biui(t) + wi(t)),
where xi(0) ∼ N (0, ζi) and is independent of wi. Each agent has a one-step utility function
Fi(xi(t), ui(t)) = qix
2
i (t) + riu
2
i (t).
We suppose that qi ≤ 0 and ri < 0. Let X(t) = [x1(t), ..., xN(t)]T , U(t) = [u1(t), ..., uN(t)]T
and W (t) = [w1(t), ..., wN(t)]T . Let Q = diag(q1, ..., qN) ≤ 0, R = diag(r1, ..., rN) < 0, A =
diag(a1, ..., aN), B = diag(b1, ..., bN), Σ = diag(σ1, ..., σN) > 0 and Z = diag(ζ1, ..., ζN) >
0. Let RSW :=
∑T−1
t=0 [X
T (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)] be the random social welfare, i.e., the
variable whose expectation is the social welfare of the agents, and let SW := E[RSW ] denote
the (expected) social welfare. The random social welfare could also be called the “ex-post social
welfare”. The ISO aims to maximize the social welfare:
max E
T−1∑
t=0
[
XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)
]
subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BU(t) +W (t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t, (4.4.0.3)
X(0) ∼ N (0, Z),W ∼ N (0,Σ).
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We now introduce a “layered” payment structure which ensures incentive compatibility for
LQG systems. We begin by rewriting the random social welfare, and thereby also the social wel-
fare, in terms more convenient for us. We will decompose the state X(t) of the entire system
comprised of all agents as:
X(t) :=
t∑
s=0
X(s, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1, (4.4.0.4)
where X(s, s) := W (s− 1) for s ≥ 1 and X(0, 0) := X(0). Let
X(s, t) := AX(s, t− 1) +BU(s, t− 1), 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1, (4.4.0.5)
with U(s, t) yet to be specified. We suppose that U(t) can also be decomposed as:
U(t) :=
t∑
s=0
U(s, t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. (4.4.0.6)
Then regardless of how the U(s, t)’s are chosen, as long as the U(s, t)’s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t are indeed a
decomposition of U(t), i.e., (4.4.0.6) is satisfied, the random social welfare can be written in terms
of X(s, t)’s and U(s, t)’s as:
RSW =
T−1∑
s=0
Ls,
where Ls for s ≥ 1 is defined as:
Ls : =
T−1∑
t=s
[
XT (s, t)QX(s, t) + UT (s, t)RU(s, t) (4.4.0.7)
+2
(
s−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)
QX(s, t) + 2
(
s−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)
RU(s, t)
]
,
and L0 is defined as:
L0 :=
T−1∑
t=0
[
XT (0, t)QX(0, t) + UT (0, t)RU(0, t)
]
.
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Hence,
SW = E
T−1∑
s=0
Ls.
In the scheme to follow the ISO will choose all U(s, t)’s for future t’s at time s, based on the
information it has at time s. HenceX(s, t) is completely determined byW (s− 1), and U(s, t) for
s ≤ t ≤ T − 1. Indeed X(s, t) can be regarded as the contribution to X(t) of these variables.
Here we assume that the ISO knows the true system parameters Q, R, A and B. This may
hold if the ISO has previously run the VCG bidding scheme for a dynamic deterministic system,
or equivalently, a day-ahead market, and system parameters remain unchanged when agents par-
ticipate in the real-time stochastic market.
Instead of asking agents to bid their state, we will consider a scheme where agents will be
asked to bid their state noise. At each stage, the ISO asks the agents to bid their xi(s, s) (defined
as equal to wi(s − 1)) at each time s, for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1. Let xˆi(s, s) be what the agents actually
bid, since they may not tell the truth. Based on their bids {xˆi(s, s) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N}, the ISO solves
the following problem:
max Ls
for the system
Xˆ(s, t) = AXˆ(s, t− 1) +BU(s, t− 1), for t > s,
with
Xˆ(s, s) = [xˆ1(s, s), ..., xˆN(s, s)]
T ,
subject to the constraint
1TU(s, t) = 0, for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1.
Here Xˆ(s, t) is the zero-noise state variable updates starting from the “initial condition” Xˆ(s, s).
Let U∗(s, t) denote the optimal solution.
The interpretation is the following. Based on the bids, Xˆ(s, s), which is supposedly a bid of
W (s − 1), the ISO calculates the trajectory of the linear systems from time s onward, assuming
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zero noise from that point on. It then allocates consumptions/generations U(s, t) for future periods
t for the corresponding deterministic linear system, with balance of consumption and production
(4.4.0.3) at each time t. These can be regarded as taking into account the consequences of the
disturbance occurring at time s.
Next, the ISO collects a payment pi(s) from agent i at time s as:
pi(s) := hi(Xˆ−i(s, s))−
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qjxˆ
2
j(s, t) + rju
∗2
j (s, t)
+2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, t)
)
xˆj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
uj(τ, t)
)
u∗j(s, t)
]
,
where Xˆ−i(s, s) = [xˆ1(s, s), ..., xˆi−1(s, s), xˆi+1(s, s), ...
, xˆN(s, s)]
T , and hi is any arbitrary function (as in the Groves mechanism).
Before we prove incentive compatibility, we need to define the notion of “rational agents”.
Definition 6. Rational Agents: We say agent i is rational at time T − 1, if it adopts a dominant
strategy whenever there exists a unique dominant strategy. An agent i is rational at time t if it adopts
a dominant strategy at time t under the assumption that all agents including itself are rational at
times t+ 1, t+ 2, ..., T − 1, whenever there is a unique such dominant strategy.
Theorem 9. Truth-telling of state xˆi(s, s) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1, i.e., bidding xˆi(s, s) = wi(s − 1),
is the unique dominant strategy for the stochastic ISO mechanism, if system parameters Q ≤ 0,
R < 0, A and B are known, and agents are rational.
Proof. Below, by "net" utility, we mean the utility derived by an agent minus its payment. We
show this by backward induction. Let Agent j, j ̸= i bid xˆj(s, s) at time s. Given the bids xˆj(s, s)
of other agents, let Ji(s) be the net utility of agent i from time s onward if it bids truthful xi(s, s),
i.e., wi(s− 1), and let Jˆi(s) be the net utility if it bids possibly untruthful xˆi(s, s). Let U∗(s, t) be
the ISO’s assignments if agent i bids truthfully and let Uˆ∗(s, t) be the ISO’s assignments if agent i
bids untruthfully.
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We will first consider time T − 1, since we are employing backward induction. Suppose that
xi(s, T − 1) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 2 were the past bids, and ui(s, T − 1) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 2,
were those portions of the allocations for the future already decided in the past. Our interest is on
analyzing what should be the current bid xi(T −1, T −1), and the consequent additional allocation
ui(T − 1, T − 1). Now
Ji(T − 1) = qix2i (T − 1) + riu2i (T − 1)− pi(T − 1)
= qi
[
xi(T − 1, T − 1) +
T−2∑
s=0
xi(s, T − 1)
]2
+ ri
[
u∗i (T − 1, T − 1) +
T−2∑
s=0
ui(s, T − 1)
]2
− pi(T − 1).
Now xi(s, T − 1) for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 2 depend only on previous bids xi(s, s), and thus those terms
can be treated as constants. In addition, the hi term depends only on other agents’ bids. As a
consequence, when comparing Ji(T − 1) with Jˆi(T − 1), one can just regard hi ≡ 0. Hence we
can simply write Ji(T − 1) as:
Ji(T − 1) = qix2i (T − 1, T − 1) + riu∗2i (T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2qi
(
T−2∑
s=0
xi(s, T − 1)
)
xi(T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2ri
(
T−2∑
s=0
ui(s, T − 1)
)
u∗i (T − 1, T − 1)
+
∑
j ̸=i
[
qjxˆ
2
j(T − 1, T − 1) + rju∗2j (T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2qj
(
T−2∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, T − 1)
)
xˆj(T − 1, T − 1)
+ 2rj
(
T−2∑
τ=0
uj(τ, T − 1)
)
u∗j(T − 1, T − 1)
]
.
It is seen that Ji(T − 1) is in the same form as LT−1. Jˆi(T − 1) is obtained by replacing u∗i with
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uˆ∗i . We conclude that Ji(T − 1) ≥ Jˆi(T − 1) because u∗i is the optimal solution to LT−1 when
xˆi(T − 1, T − 1) = xi(T − 1, T − 1). Moreover truth telling is the unique optimal strategy since
ri < 0.
We next employ induction and so assume that truth-telling of states is the dominant strategy
equilibrium at time k. Let Ht be the history up to time t. If agents are rational, we can take the
expectation over future X(s, s), s ≥ k, which are i.i.d. Gaussian noise vectors, and calculate
Ji(k − 1) (where, as before, we simply take the first Groves term hi ≡ 0):
Ji(k − 1) =
qix
2
i (k − 1) + riu2i (k − 1)− pi(k − 1) + E [Ji(k)|Hk−1]
= qi
[
xi(k − 1, k − 1) +
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, k − 1)
]2
+ ri
[
ui(k − 1, k − 1) +
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, k − 1)
]2
− pi(k − 1)
+ E
[
T−1∑
t=k
(
qix
2
i (t) + riu
2
i (t)− pi(t)
) ∣∣∣∣Hk−1
]
.
(4.4.0.8)
We first show that E[U∗(k, k)|hk−1] = 0. By completing the square for Lk in (4.4.0.7), we have
the following equivalent problem for the ISO to solve for the k-th layer:
max
T−1∑
t=k
[(
X(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)T
Q·
(
X(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t)
)
+
(
U(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)T
R·(
U(k, t) +
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, t)
)]
(4.4.0.9)
Now, for the fixed k of interest, letting Y (t) := X(k, t) +
∑k−1
τ=0X(τ, t), and V (t) := U(k, t) +∑k−1
τ=0 U(τ, t), we see that Y (t) = AY (t− 1) + BV (t− 1) for t ≥ k + 1. The “initial" condition
is Y (k) = X(k). For this linear system, the optimal control law for the cost (4.4.0.9) under the
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balancing constraint for all t is a control law that is linear in the state. Denoting the optimal gain
by K(t), we have
U∗(k, k) +
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, k) = K(k)
[
X(k, k) +
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, k)
]
.
Similarly, at time k − 1, the ISO chooses the allocation at time k by using the same gain K(t)
applied to that portion of the state at time k resulting from disturbances up to time k − 1:
U(k − 1, k) +
k−2∑
τ=0
U(τ, k) =
k−1∑
τ=0
U(τ, k) = K(k)·[
X(k − 1, k) +
k−2∑
τ=0
X(τ, k)
]
= K(k)
[
k−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, k)
]
.
Consequently,
E[U∗(k, k)|hk−1] = K(k)E[X(k, k)|hk−1] = 0,
since all agents are truth-telling at time k, i.e., E[X(k, k)|Hk−1] = E[W (k − 1)] = 0. From
(4.4.0.5), by linearity of the system, we consequently also have E[X(k, t)|Hk−1] = 0, k < t ≤
T − 1, and E[U(k, t)|Hk−1] = 0, k < t ≤ T − 1. Therefore, for k ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
E[x2i (t)|Hk−1] = E
[
t∑
τ=k
xi(τ, t) +
k−1∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]2
=
[
k−1∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]2
+ C = x2i (k − 1, t) + 2xi(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
+
[
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]2
+ C,
where C is a fixed term corresponding to the variance of
∑t
τ=k xi(τ, t) and
[∑k−2
s=0 xi(s, t)
]2
could
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be treated as a constant since it depends only previous bids. Similarly, we have, for t ≥ k,
E[u2i (t)|Hk−1] =
u2i (k − 1, t) + 2ui(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, t) +
[
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, t)
]2
+ C,
We also have,
E[pi(t)|Hk−1] = const.,
since E[xj(t, τ)|Hk−1] = 0 and E[uj(t, τ)|Hk−1] = 0, for τ ≥ t. By ignoring the constant term,
we now have,
Ji(k − 1) =
qix
2
i (k − 1, k − 1) + 2qixi(k − 1, k − 1)
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, k − 1)
+riu
2
i (k − 1, k − 1) + 2riui(k − 1, k − 1)
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, k − 1)
+
T−1∑
t=k
[
qix
2
i (k − 1, t) + 2qixi(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
xi(s, t)
]
+
T−1∑
t=k
[
riu
2
i (k − 1, t) + 2riui(k − 1, t)
k−2∑
s=0
ui(s, t)
]
−pi(k − 1)
=
T−1∑
t=k−1
[
qix
2
i (k − 1, t) + riu2i (k − 1, t)
+ 2qi
(
k−2∑
τ=0
xi(τ, t)
)
xi(k − 1, t)
+ 2ri
(
k−2∑
τ=0
ri(τ, t)
)
ri(k − 1, t)
]
− pi(k − 1).
It is straightforward to check that Ji(k − 1) is in the same form as Lk−1 and thus we conclude that
truth-telling xˆi(k− 1, k− 1) = xi(k− 1, k− 1) is the unique dominant strategy for agent i at time
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k − 1.
The above proof yields the following two corollaries.
Corollary 1. In the stochastic VCG mechanism, truth-telling of state constitutes a “subgame per-
fect dominant strategy equilibrium” in the sense that truth-telling of state is the unique dominant
strategy for every subgame of the original game.
Now let us consider systems where the distribution of the noise is not Gaussian, but the noises
are independent, mean zero, and have finite variance. Then the optimal centralized solution for
social welfare maximization is not necessarily linear in the states. However, one can consider the
optimal strategy in the class of linear strategies. Then the ISO can employ the same payment
scheme to ensure that the system attains this optimal social welfare in the class of linear strategies:
Corollary 2. Consider the system above, where the noises are independent, mean zero, and have
finite variance. Then the ISO can ensure through the mechanism described above that the system
attains the optimal social welfare in the class of all linear strategies.
We note that the key to proving incentive compatibility for the layered VCG mechanism lies
in the fact that the optimal feedback gain K(k) remains unchanged for each round of bids. This
is due to the fact that K(k) is only a function of Q, R, A, and B. Therefore, if bidding of system
parameters at the beginning is allowed, then the layered VCG mechanism may not be incentive
compatible. We show this by the following counterexample.
Example 2. Let T = 4. The agents’ system equations and cost matrices have the following param-
eters: (a1, a2, a3, a4) = (1, 1, 1, 1), (b1, b2, b3, b4) = (1, 1, 1, 1), (q1, q2, q3, q4) = (−1,−1,−1,−1),
(r1, r2, r3, r4) = (−1,−1.1,−1.2,−1.1), (ζ1, ζ2, ζ3, ζ4) = (0.3, 0.32, 0.31, 0.3) and (σ1, σ2, σ3, σ4)
= (0.1, 0.11, 0.11, 0.12). If system operator knows all the parameters of agents, and every agent
bid its true state, then the expected net utility of agent 1 (expected total utility minus expected total
payment) is 0.629. When agents are also allowed to bid their system parameters at the beginning,
truth-telling of state may not be incentive compatible. Suppose that agents 2, 3, 4 remain truthful,
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namely, bid their true system parameters at the beginning and their true states at all times. Sup-
pose now that agent 1 intentionally bids an untruthful qˆ1 = −1.3 while bidding other parameters
truthfully at the beginning. Assume also that agent 1 always bids its state as if there is no noise
(w1(t) ≡ 0). Now agent 1’s net expected utility is 0.631. Therefore, agent 1’s optimal strategy is
not to bid its true state when it is allowed to bid its system parameters at the beginning.
The assumption that the ISO knows the system parameters of all the agents can perhaps be
justified since the ISO can learn these parameters by running the day-ahead market (a dynamic
deterministic market) where agents are guaranteed to bid their true system parameters as shown in
the previous section.
4.4.1 Budget Balance and Individual Rationality in LQG systems
We extend the notion of the SVCG mechanism to the stochastic dynamic systems as follows:
pi(s) := c ·
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qjxˆ
2
j(s, t) + rju
(i)2
j (s, t)
+ 2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, t)
)
xˆj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
u
(i)(τ,t)
j
)
u
(i)
j (s, t)
]
−
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qjxˆ
2
j(s, t) + rju
∗2
j (s, t)
+ 2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xˆj(τ, t)
)
xˆj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
uj(τ, t)
)
u∗j(s, t)
]
,
where u(i)j (s, t) is the optimal solution to the following problem:
max
∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=s
[
qjx
2
j(s, t) + u
2
j(s, t)
+ 2qj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
xj(τ, t)
)
xj(s, t) + 2rj
(
s−1∑
τ=0
uj(τ, t)
)
uj(s, t)
]
subject to
xj(s, t) = ajxj(s, t− 1) + bjuj(s, t− 1), for s < t ≤ T − 1,
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∑
j ̸=i
uj(s, t) = 0, for s ≤ t ≤ T − 1,
xj(s, s) = xˆj(s, s).
As in the static case, based on its prior knowledge of a suitable range for c, the ISO can choose a
range of c, which does not depend on the agents’ bids, to achieve BB and IR.
Truth-telling is a dominant strategy under the SVCG mechanism because it falls under the
Groves mechanism. Under the dominant strategy equilibrium, every agent i will bid its true state
xi(s, s), i.e., wi(s− 1).
Theorem 10. Let U∗(t) be the optimal solution to the following problem:
max E
T−1∑
t=0
[XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)]
subject to
X(t+ 1) = AX(t) +BU(t) +W (t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t,
X(0) ∼ N (0, Z),W ∼ N (0,Σ).
Let X(i)(t) := [x1(t), ..., xi−1(t), xi+1(t), ...xN(t)]T , and similarly let Q(i), R(i), A(i), B(i), Z(i)
and Σ(i) be the matrix with the i-th component removed. Let U (i)(t) be the optimal solution to the
following problem:
max E
T−1∑
t=0
[X(i)T (t)Q(i)X(i)(t) + UT (t)R(i)U(t)]
subject to
X(i)(t+ 1) = A(i)X(i)(t) +B(i)U(t) +W (i)(t),
1TU(t) = 0, for ∀t,
85
X(i)(0) ∼ N (0, Z(i)),W (i) ∼ N (0,Σ(i)).
Let Hi := E
∑T−1
t=0 [X
(i)T (t)Q(i)X(i)(t) + U (i)T (t)R(i)U (i)(t)] and let Hmax := maxiHi. Let
F ∗ = E
∑T−1
t=0 [X
T (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t)]. If F ∗ > 0, Hi > 0 for all i, and MPB (4.3.0.2)
condition holds, there exists an c and c¯, with c ≤ c¯ such that if the constant c is chosen in the range
[c, c¯], then the SVCG mechanism for the deterministic dynamic system satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR
at the same time.
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that under the earlier dominant strategy,
E
[ T−1∑
s=0
pi(s)
]
= c ·Hi − E
[∑
j ̸=i
T−1∑
t=0
(
qjx
2
j(t) + rju
∗2
j (t)
)]
since wi’s are i.i.d. and ui(t) is linear in xi(t). Hence, to achieve budget balance, we need,
E
[∑
i
T−1∑
s=0
pi(s)
]
= c ·
∑
i
Hi − (N − 1)F ∗ ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
c ≥ (N − 1)F
∗∑
iHi
.
To achieve individual rationality for agent i, we need
E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
qix
2
i (t) + riu
∗2
i (t)
)− T−1∑
s=0
pi(s)
]
= F ∗ − c ·Hi ≥ 0,
or equivalently,
c ≤ F
∗
Hi
.
Combining both inequalities, we have
(N − 1)F ∗∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ F
∗
Hmax
.
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Let c = (N−1)F
∗∑
iHi
and c¯ = F
∗
Hmax
. To ensure c ≤ c¯, one sufficient condition is,
(N − 1)Hmax ≤
∑
i
Hi, F
∗ > 0, Hi > 0 for all i.
4.4.2 Lagrange Optimality in LQG Systems
In general, just as for a static problem, the SVCG mechanism is not Lagrange optimal. Within
the feasible range [c, c¯], one can choose a c that achieves near Lagrange optimality. This can be
formulated as a MinMax problem:
min
c
max
i
∣∣∣∣∣ di(c)E∑T−1t=0 [λ∗(t)u∗i (t)]
∣∣∣∣∣ , subject to (4.3.0.3),
where
di(c) := E
T−1∑
t=0
[λ∗(t)u∗i (t)− pi(t)]
= E
T−1∑
t=0
[λ∗(t)u∗i (t)]− c ·Hi + E
[
T−1∑
t=0
(
qjx
2
j(t) + rju
∗2
j (t)
)]
.
The MinMax problem can be transformed to a linear program:
min Z
subject to
Z ≥ di(c)
E
∑T−1
t=0 [λ
∗(t)u∗i (t)]
, for all i,
Z ≥ − di(c)
E
∑T−1
t=0 [λ
∗(t)u∗i (t)]
, for all i,
(N − 1)F ∗∑
iHi
≤ c ≤ F
∗
Hmax
.
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We illustrate the MinMax problem with a numerical example below.
Example 3. We use the same system parameters as in Example 2. The optimal solution to the
MinMax problem is (c∗, Z∗) = (0.96, 0.21). Thus, by choosing c = 0.96, the SVCG mechanism
satisfies IC, EF, BB and IR, and all agents expect to pay/receive within 21% of their expected
Lagrange optimal payments.
However, just as for deterministic systems, as the number of agents increases, the scaled-VCG
mechanism does achieve asymptotic Lagrange Optimality.
Theorem 11. If (ak, bk, pk, qk, ζk, σk) satisfy the following:
1. a ≤ |ai|≤ a¯, b ≤ |bi|≤ b¯, q ≤ qi ≤ q¯ < 0 and r ≤ ri ≤ r¯ < 0
2. F ∗ > 0, Hi > 0 for all i, and MPB condition holds,
then the following holds:
1. There is a range of cN that could be chosen to achieve BB and IR, and limN→∞ cN = 1,
2. Asymptotic Lagrange Optimality: limN→∞ E
∑T−1
t=0
[
λN(t)uNi (t)− pNi (t)
]
= 0, where λN(t)
is the stochastic process corresponding to the power balance constraint.
Proof. At each layer, the ISO is solving a deterministic LQR problem, and from Theorem 8 we
have,
lim
N→∞
L∗s
Hs,1
= 1, for 0 ≤ s ≤ T − 1,
where L∗s is the maximum value of Ls and Hs,1 is the maximum social welfare when agent 1 is
excluded. Moreover, as we have shown in Theorem 9, the sum of U∗(s, t) calculated at each layer
is indeed the optimal solution U∗(t) =
∑t
s=0 U
∗(s, t). Consequently,
lim
N→∞
F ∗N
HN1
= lim
N→∞
E
∑T−1
s=0 L
∗
s
E
∑T−1
s=0 Hs,1
= 1.
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Similarly we can show that limN→∞ F
∗
HNk
= 1 for k ̸= 1. Therefore,
lim
N→∞
c¯N = 1.
Let Hmin = minHi. Since
(N−1)F ∗N
NHmax
≤ cN ≤ (N−1)F ∗N
NHmin
,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
Hence,
lim
N→∞
cN = 1.
We next show that the total expected VCG payment converges to the total expected Lagrange
payment when N goes to infinity. To calculate λ(t), we solve the following one-step problem:
max
U(t)
XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t) + E
[
XT (t+ 1)Pt+1X(t+ 1)
]
subject to
1TU(t) = 0.
where Pt is the Ricatti matrix of the unconstrained problem where balance constraint 1TU(t) = 0,
or u1(t) = −
∑N
i=2 ui(t) is substituted in both the objective and the state equation.
The Lagrangian is,
L = XT (t)QX(t) + UT (t)RU(t) + E [XT (t+ 1)Pt+1X(t+ 1)]
− λ(t)1TU(t)
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Take partial derivative with respect to U(t) and λ(t), we have
∂L
∂U(t)
=2RU(t) + 2BTPt+1BU(t) + 2B
TPt+1AX(t)− λ(t)1 = 0,
∂L
∂λ(t)
= 1TU(t) = 0.
The Lagrange multiplier λ(t) is thus calculated as:
λ(t) = 2
[
1T (R +BTPt+1B)
−11
]−1 ·
1T (R +BTPt+1B)
−1BTPt+1AX(t) = ΦtX(t). (4.4.2.1)
At time s, we denote λ(s, t) as the Lagrange multipliers associated with the balance constraint
1TU(s, t) = 0. From Theorem 8, we have
lim
N→∞
[(
T−1∑
t=s
λN(s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (s)
]
= 0.
Summing over s, we have
lim
N→∞
T−1∑
s=0
[(
T−1∑
t=s
λN(s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (s)
]
= lim
N→∞
T−1∑
t=0
[(
t∑
s=0
λN(s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (t)
]
= 0.
From (4.4.0.9), we have, at time s,
λ(s, t) = Φt
s∑
τ=0
X(τ, t),
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and at time s− 1,
λ(s− 1, t) = Φt
s−1∑
τ=0
X(τ, t).
Therefore,
λ(s, t) = λ(s− 1, t) + ΦtX(s, t).
The Lagrange multiplier λ(t) associated with the balance constraint 1TU(t) = 0 can be calcu-
lated as:
λ(t) = ΦtX(t) = Φt
t∑
s=0
X(s, t) = λ(t, t).
As a result,
λN(t)u∗Ni (t) = λ
N(t)
t∑
s=0
u∗Ni (s, t)
=
t∑
s=0
[(
λN(s, t) + Φt
t∑
τ=s+1
X(τ, t)
)
u∗Ni (s, t)
]
Because X(0) is independent ofW (t) andW (t) are i.i.d.,
E[X(τ, t)u∗Ni (s, t)] = 0, for τ ≥ s+ 1,
Therefore,
lim
N→∞
E
T−1∑
t=0
[
λN(t)u∗Ni (t)− pNi (t)
]
= lim
N→∞
E
T−1∑
t=0
[(
t∑
s=0
λN(s, t)u∗Ni (s, t)
)
− pNi (t)
]
= 0.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 2, we have developed a layered decomposition approach that permits a holistic
solution to solving the scheduling, storage and pricing problems of charging stations. The key
idea is to decompose problems by time-scale. At the top layer, the long-term pricing is determined
with grid power price and renewable energy assumed to be their deterministic long-term averages,
and total consumption given by the static price-demand curve. The middle layer determines the
amounts of energy to buy from the grid and to use for charging, with the mean rate of the stochastic
arrivals depending on the price set at the top-layer. At the bottom layer, the resulting real-time
scheduling of EVs becomes trivial and is solved by an earliest deadline first policy.
In Chapter 3, we have formulated the ISO problem of allocating the power supply and demand
over heterogeneous energy producing or consuming agents, connected to a smart-grid in a dynamic
fashion with network flow constraints, both under a deterministic setting and a stochastic setting
when there are uncertainties affecting generation as well as consumption. We have proposed two
decentralized iterative algorithms to solve the deterministic version and stochastic version of the
problem. We have shown that under concavity assumptions, Algorithm 1 achieves the global max-
imum of social welfare in the absence of noise. The ISO will play a central role in inducing
co-operation among agents by declaring prices, and agents do not need to be aware of each oth-
ers’ states or utilities. The only communication from the ISO is the price policy, and from the
agents their energy supply or consumption in response to prices. LMPs arise when constraints on
branches for power flow are binding. Compared to the current short-sighted one-step ISO scheme,
simulation results shows that there is an increase in social welfare for both day-ahead and real-time
market when Algorithms 1 and 2 are applied respectively.
In Chapter 4, we have shown that for the special case of LQG agents, by careful construction of
a sequence of layered VCG payments over time, the intertemporal effect of current bids on future
payoffs can be decoupled, and truth-telling of dynamic states is guaranteed if system parameters
are known and agents are rational. We have also shown that a modification of the VCG payments,
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called scaled-VCG payments, achieves Budget Balance and Individual Rationality for a range of
scaling, under a certain identified Market Power Balance condition. In the asymptotic regime of
increasing population of agents, the scaled-VCG payments converge to the Lagrange payments,
that is the payments that the agents would make in the absence of strategic consideration.
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